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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Leotis Brannon Branigh, III, appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, for 
first degree murder. 
Statement Of The Facts 
Desiree Anderson and her ex-husband, Mike Johnston, had two children 
together, and were again living with each other the day Mike was murdered, October 1, 
2007. (Tr., vol. 1, p.472, Ls.16-23.) In March of 2007, when Desiree was no longer 
married, she met Branigh and became intimate with him. (Tr., vol. 1, p.481 , L.8 - p.482, 
L.6.) Desiree made two rules clear to Branigh: he was to leave no marks and not tell 
anyone they were having sex. (Tr., vol. 1, p.482, L.23 - p.483, L.6.) Although Desiree 
was considering reuniting with Mike, she went on a weekend trip to Seattle with 
Branigh, and while there, pictures were taken of them during a romantic encounter, with 
her consent. (Tr., vol. 1, p.483, L.10 - p.484, L.19.) 
Branigh told Mike about the pictures (Tr., vol. 1, p.484, Ls.20-22) and after 
Desiree told Branigh in May of 2007 that she was breaking up their relationship, he was 
upset (Tr., vol. 1, p.487, Ls.10-20; p.489, Ls.3-8). During their time together, Branigh 
and Desiree exchanged text messages hundreds of time, which was a common way 
they communicated. (Tr., vol. 1, p.488, Ls.1-7.) After their break-up, Desiree changed 
her phone number because Branigh's text messages were creating problems with Mike, 
and Branigh wrote her letters until he found out her new phone number and began 
texting again. (Tr., vol. 1, p.489, Ls.6-25.) 
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Desiree and Branigh began talking again, and she began going out with him and 
being intimate until early September of 2007. (Tr., vol. 1, pA90, Ls.2-22.) Branigh 
indicated to Desiree that he thought Mike was controlling and physically abusive toward 
her, but, according to Desiree, that was not true and she told Branigh that. (Tr., vol. 1, 
pA91, L.6 - pA92, L.17; pA93, Ls.20-24.) After Desiree once more told Branigh she 
was not going to see him anymore, she moved back into Mike's house. (Tr., vol. 1, 
pA93, Ls.18-19.) After the second breakup, Branigh texted her about how she could do 
this (i.e., breakup) and she would respond. (Tr., vol. 1, pA91, L.21 - pA92, LA.) 
Branigh and Mike also exchanged phone calls or text messages fairly regularly after 
Desiree stopped seeing Branigh. (Tr., vol. 1, pA93, L.25 - pA94, L.6.) According to 
Desiree, she had miscarried a pregnancy that summer, and Branigh was upset with her, 
suspecting she had done something to cause the miscarriage. (Tr., vol. 1, p.501, L.2 -
p.502, L.23.) On one occasion in September, when Desiree was leaving a night-time 
class, Branigh got into her car and would not get out, at one point threatening to snap 
her neck, until police responded to the scene. (Tr., vol. 1, pA95, L.24 - pA97, L.5.) 
On October 1, 2007, Mike Johnston went to work, and Desiree slept until about 
1 :30 p.m., until she was woken up by Branigh pounding on the front door of the house. 
(Tr., vol. 1, pA99, L.12 - p.500, L.11.) Desiree called 911 after the knocking continued, 
and when a police officer arrived, she had Branigh leave. (Tr., vol. 1, p.500, Ls.2-6.) 
When Mike got home that afternoon, he and Desiree drove to the courthouse to pick up 
paperwork for a protection order against Branigh. (Tr., vol. 1, p.500, Ls.6-21.) At about 
9:00 that evening Desiree returned a movie to a store, and when she returned, Mike 
was outside pacing back and forth watching to see if Branigh was going to drive by in 
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order to begin establishing that Branigh was stalking them. (Tr., vol. 1, p.504, Ls.3-19.) 
Branigh had texted Desiree on September 22, 2007 with a variety of messages 
that were demanding, threatening, and showed he intended to get even with her for 
having broken up their relationship. (See Sts. ExA.) On October 1, 2007, Branigh sent 
text messages to Desiree which reflected a pattern of escalating demands toward her, 
threats of harm toward Mike, and other disturbing statements, as the following sampling 
shows: 
"talk 2 me or this will get bad. aint it fun. u a working woman still" (2:38 
p.m.) 
"does mk know what u do snitch" (2:43) 
"talk to me fact 2 face like the strong woman u r and stop being scared" 
(3:32 p.m.) 
"im tryn 2 help u and u call cops on me. i love u and cant take this shit 
anymore. talk 2 me" (3:35 p.m.) 
"I WILL BE FREE" (5:45 p.m.) 
"FUK IT THEN COPS OR NO COPS" (6:20 p.m.) 
"1M READY 2 DIE" (6:21 p.m.) 
"I love u talk 2 me please im trying 2 stay out of trouble" (6:43 p.m.) 
"please help me. i can only help so much" (6:57 p.m.) 
"im not scared of mk or an of his fam" (7:24 p.m.) 
"fuk it im not afraid 2 die" (7:28 p.m.) 
"u got ur kids out of there? this is gonna b a mess" (7:55 p.m.) 
"my life is yours. if u really want me 2 sacrifice myself and let u have whats 
left, then I will. sorry it took so long. i love u my beautiful" (8:39 p.m.) 
"i dont care about dead bodies in old graves, ill fight till I win or die" (8:53 
p.m.) 
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"good bye heart of my heart" (9:02 p.m.) 
"mks done u wont talk 2 me, so I swear it on ur kids' lives, mks done" 
(9:20 p.m.) 
"u don't talk 2 me and I promise u i will take this all the way" (9:23 p.m.) 
"all u had 2 do was talk 2 me. c u in a few" (9:34 p.m.) 
"Games r what uv always bleevd. Death is an honor. U wont b touched by 
this. I WILL BE FREE." (9:36 p.m.) 
"c u in a few" (9:37 p.m.) 
"all u had 2 do was talk 2 me" (10:09 p.m.) 
(St's Ex. 4.) 
Branigh also exchanged text messages with Mike on October 1, 2007, up until 
shortly before Mike was murdered, as follows: 
Johnston: She dont want 2 talk or c u so give it up (8:58 p.m.) 
Branigh: bye mikey (8:59 p.m.) 
Johnston: I dont control her (8:59 p.m.) 
Branigh: bye mikey (9:00 p.m.) 
Johnston: Who u with tough guy (9:07 p.m.) 
Branigh: me (9:07 p.m.) 
Johnston: I dont control her (9:08 p.m.) 
Branigh: not anymore (9:09 p.m.) 
Branigh: where u at little sister (9:12 p.m.) 
Johnston: Home dumbass (9:13 p.m.) 
Branigh: hidn behind ur family and the cops still coward (9:14 p.m.) 
Branigh: bring urfukn punk ass out of there (9:16 p.m.) 
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Branigh: come on with ur stupid ass (9:17 p.m.) 
Johnston: Ive been outside 4 almost an hour (9:18 p.m.) 
Johnston: I don't depend on the cops (9:19 p.m.) 
Branigh: she will (9:20 p.m.) 
Johnston: Good 4 u (9:21 p.m.) 
Johnston: Ur cool (9:22 p.m.) 
Johnston: They might like that (9:23 p.m.) 
Branigh: bring ur punk fukn ass out of there u fukn coward (9:23 p.m.) 
Branigh: who (9:25 p.m.) 
Johnston: My parents (9:27 p.m.) 
Branigh: why (9:27 p.m.) 
Johnston: Now im done w txt (9:29 p.m.) 
Branigh: ur a coward come out of the trailer park. ur kids will never b 
harmd by me. (9:31 p.m.) 
Johnston: 1m out of there (9:49 p.m.) 
Branigh: where (10:10 p.m.) 
Branigh: waha (10:10 p.m.) 
Johnston: Drive by and see (10:10 p.m.) 
Branigh: come on (10:14 p.m.) 
Branigh: u know where 2 go coward (10:15 p.m.) 
Branigh: u comin (10:17 p.m.) 
Branigh: u comin (10:19 p.m.) 
(State's Exhibit 60, pp.9-11.) The shooting occurred just after Branigh sent the last text 
message to Mike Johnston at 10:19 p.m. on October 1, 2007. (ld., p.11.) 
5 
The district court summarized, in its decision denying Branigh's motion for a new 
trial, additional testimony presented at trial which showed Branigh's guilt. The district 
court's summary of the evidence, with bracketed references to the record, relates the 
ensuing events as follows: 
Among the State's witnesses was the woman [Kendra Parker] who lived in 
the house at the intersection where the shooting occurred. [Tr., vol. 1, 
p.602, Ls.10-19.] The witness testified she had gone outside to retrieve 
items from her car trunk, noticed a white car idling at the intersection, 
heard a male voice, then heard a gunshot and saw a corresponding flash 
of light inside the white car. [Id., p.602, L.23 - p.603, L.17.] As she 
crouched on the ground, she heard four to five more gunshots, heard a 
male voice say "Oh shit, man", and then watched the white car slowly 
drive away. [Id., p.603, Ls.13-22.] When the car drove away, the witness 
ran into her house and dialed 911. [Id.] During her testimony, the witness 
looked at several pictures of Defendant Branigh's vehicle and identified it 
as the same or similar white Camaro she saw idling in the middle of the 
intersection when she heard shots fired and saw muzzle [sic] flash inside 
the vehicle. [Id., p.610, L.11 - p.611, L.5.] 
Another of the State's witnesses was a gentleman [Brian Hodge] 
delivering a trailer in the area where the shooting occurred. [Tr., vol. 1, 
p.620, L.25 - p.621, L.10.] The witness noticed a white Camaro with its 
headlights on sitting off the side of the road ahead of and facing him. [Id., 
p.621, Ls.6-13; p.624, L.22 - p.625, L.14.] Because he was concerned 
about what the driver was doing, he slowed down to around 15 miles per 
hour. [Id., p.621, Ls.16-21.] He then heard several pops he believed to be 
gunshots. [Id.] Immediately after the gunshots stopped, the white Camaro 
pulled over into its lane and drove away at a normal rate of speed. [Id., 
p.622, L.21 - p. 623, L.6.] The witness looked around as he drove by but, 
when he saw nothing of concern, he continued on and delivered the 
trailer. [Id., p.623, L.7 - p.624, L.9.] When he drove back, he saw a 
number of emergency vehicles so he stopped and told the police what he 
had seen. [Id., p.624, Ls.9-12.] Being a bit of a car buff, the witness said 
he noted that the white car was an early 1980's IROC Camaro with a dent 
in the driver's right front fender. [Id., p.624, L.17 - p.625, L.14.] After 
looking at pictures of the Defendant's Camaro during his testimony at trial, 
the witness said the car he saw was either the same car or an identical 
car. [Id., p.625, L.15 - p.627, L.15.] 
A third State's witness [Doug Bolten] testified he was watching TV 
with his wife when he heard one or two gunshots. [Tr., vol. 1, p.631, L.17-
p.632, L.3.] As he hurried to his window to look outside, he heard four or 
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five more shots[11 and saw flashes of light reflecting off a nearby house. 
[Id.] He then ran downstairs to his door where he found Michael Johnston 
standing on his porch holding his chest. [Id., p.632, Ls.11-13.] Johnston 
told the gentleman he had been shot by a man in a white car. [Id., p.632, 
Ls.13-15; p.634, Ls.7-8.] The witness told Johnston to lie down on the 
porch where it was cooler. [Id., p.635, Ls.5-9.] He then went back into his 
house, turned off the porch light in case the shooter returned, locked his 
door, and dialed 911. [Id., p.635, L.11 - p.636, L.2.] After talking to the 
911 dispatcher, he turned the phone over to his wife and went back out to 
his porch to comfort Johnston until the police and ambulance arrived. [Id., 
p.636, Ls.7-18.] 
In addition to witnesses that were in the area at the time of the 
shooting, the State called two witnesses [Gina Barton and Dawn Gump] 
that testified to seeing a white Camaro near the area of the shooting a few 
hours prior to the homicide. [Tr., vol. 1, p.590, L.13 - p.591, L.14; p.597, 
L.15 - p.599, L.12.] Both witnesses described the vehicle as being driven 
erratically or recklessly [id.], both identified a picture of the Defendant's 
vehicle as being the same or similar to the vehicle they had seen in the 
area [id., p.593, Ls.11-20; p.598, Ls.21-25], with one witness even 
identifying Defendant Branigh as the driver of the white Camaro that had 
caused her concern on the day of the shooting [id., p.591, L.15 - p.593, 
L.5; p.598, Ls.12-20]Yl Finally, the jury was provided with copies of the 
heated, and at times ominous, text messages exchanged between phones 
belong [sic] to Defendant Branigh, victim Michael Johnston, and Desiree 
Anderson Johnston. 
Finally, the jury was presented with evidence of a high speed chase 
by police as they attempted to take Defendant Branigh into custody that 
same night. [Tr., vol. 1, p.694, L.12 - p.696, L.2.] Branigh quickly became 
a susRect in the shooting and a description of his vehicle was broadcast to 
police. [Id., p.673, Ls.17-23; p.682, Ls.14-19; p.691, L.15 - p.692, L.5.] 
The vehicle was soon observed by a police officer in Clarkston, 
Washington who attempted to stop Branigh's vehicle. [Id., p.674, Ls.7-13; 
p.677, L.24 - p.679, L.21.] However, Branigh drove out of Clarkston and 
into Lewiston at a high rate of speed, where Nez Perce County deputies 
and Lewiston police officers took up the pursuit of Branigh, which ended 
near his parents' home. [Id., p.679, L.22 - p.680, LA; p.696, L.2.] Branigh, 
1 Mr. Bolten initially stated that he had "seen three or four more shots[,]" but then 
clarified that he had seen flashes of four more shots after the first one or two shots. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.631, L.25 - p.632, L.9.) 
2 Both Gina Barton and Dawn Gump identified Branigh as the driver of the car they had 
seen driving erratically earlier in the day. (Tr., vol. 1, p.591, L.15 - p.593, L.5; p.598, 
Ls.12-20.) 
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who resisted officers even after the high speed pursuit had ended, was 
eventually taken into custody and placed under arrest for the shooting 
death of Michael JohnstonPl [Id., p.697, L.11 - p. 698, L.3; p.699, Ls.16-
17; p.705, Ls.5-9.] 
(Supp. R., pp.478-480.) 
Further, when questioned after being taken into custody, Branigh told Lewiston 
Police Department Corporal Joedy Mundell that he could not recall being in the area of 
the murder (11 th and Cedar Streets) about 10:00 or 11 :00 that evening, but it was 
possible that he had been there, and "eluded [sic]" that Desiree was in some kind of 
danger as a result of Mike. (Tr., vol. 1, p.701, Ls.8-21.) According to Corporal 
Mundell's testimony: 
[Branigh] stated that he - that he would die for Desiree, he also 
stated he would kill for Desiree. When I asked him about the pursuit, he 
advised that he had taken off because - basically because the cops had 
pissed him off, but told me that he had been stopped in times past and 
there had been no problem. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.702, Ls.20-25.) 
Ronnie White, a jail inmate at the time Branigh was awaiting trial, testified (as a 
defense witness) that he overheard Branigh and Stephen Peak4 (another inmate) in a 
conversation during which Branigh said "something about a gun up on the hill" (Tr., vol. 
1, p.927, Ls.3-6), and further explained that he had heard Branigh say "something about 
3 Mike Johnston died that evening in the emergency room at St. Joseph's Hospital in 
Lewiston from a gunshot wound to the chest. (Tr., vol. 1, p.651, Ls.2-4; p.662, Ls.18-
21.) 
4 Stephen Peak also testified at trial about statements Branigh made to him during their 
stay in the Nez Perce County Jail. The admission of those statements was challenged 
in Branigh's motion for a new trial based on both the allegation that the prosecutor 
withheld potentially eXCUlpatory information under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), and due to newly discovered evidence of Peak's relationship with Sheriff Dorion 
at that time. Inasmuch as the district court found a Brady violation occurred, but found 
the violation was immaterial in light of the remaining evidence, Peak's testimony is not 
included here. 
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telling them that there - that there might have been a gun buried on the hill, and that -
and that after you told them that, then if they were - if they were serious about the case 
or something like that, that they would go up there and look and you'd be able to sit 
here and see them looking for it or something like that" (id., p.928, Ls.9-16). 
Course Of The Proceedings 
Branigh was charged by Information with murder in the first degree, felony 
eluding, and an enhancement for use of a firearm or deadly weapon during the 
commission of the murder. (R., vol. I, pp.64-66.) After Branigh's motion to sever 
Counts I and II was granted (id., pp.76-77, 147-150), an Amended Information was filed 
eliminating the felony eluding charge (id., pp.179-180). 
Branigh, through counsel, filed a first motion in limine seeking (in essence) 
suppression of Branigh's cell phone records obtained by a search warrant on Sprint 
Nextel in Kansas. (R., vol. II, pp.306-307.) That motion was tentatively granted by the 
court (id., pp.752-757), but after the state filed a motion for reconsideration based upon 
18 U.S.C. § 2701 (et seq.), the Stored Communications Act, the court reversed its ruling 
just before trial. (Tr., vol. 1, p.229, L.16 - p.231, L.25; R., vol. IV, pp.752-757.) Branigh 
filed a second motion in limine, seeking an order that the state be precluded from 
referring to any I.R.E. 404(b) type evidence without prior approval of the court, which 
was granted. (R., vol. '", pp.531-532; Tr., vol. 1, p.183, LsA-22.) Branigh also filed a 
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, which was denied. (ld., pp.541-542; R., 
vol. IV, pp.752-757.) 
On the day of trial, at Branigh's request, he was permitted to represent himself 
during the course of trial, with standby counsel. (Tr., vol. 1, pA35, Ls.5-9.) At the end 
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of the trial, the jury convicted Branigh of first degree murder and found he used a 
firearm during the commission of that crime. (R, vol. V, pp.941-942.) Branigh filed a 
motion for a new trial based on a variety of complaints, which was denied. (ld., pp.984-
988, 1010-1020.) Branigh's motion for reconsideration was also denied. (ld., pp.1034-
1035.) Branigh was sentenced to fixed life for the first degree murder of Mike Johnston, 
and 15 years fixed for the firearm enhancement. (ld., pp.1070-1073.) Branigh filed a 
Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which was denied. (Id., pp.1100-1102, 1109-
1110.) Branigh filed a timely notice of appeal (id" pp.1082-1087), and the state filed a 
notice of cross-appeal (id., pp.1 096-1 098), to challenge whether the portion of a victim's 
impact letter making a sentencing recommendation had been erroneously stricken by 
the court. 
Counsel for Branigh filed a "Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative Motion to 
Reconsider Previously Denied Motion for New Trial" (R, vol. V, pp.1088-1089.) His 
new motion for a new trial was based on having recently been informed that Stephen 
Peak, who testified at trial about statements Branigh made while they were in jail 
together, had a much closer relationship with (then) Nez Perce County Sheriff Jim 
Dorion than previously known. His latest motion for a new trial claimed information 
about Peak's relationship with Sheriff Dorion entitled him to a new trial because it was 
known, and withheld by the prosecutor in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), and (2) was newly discovered evidence entitling him to a new trial under I.C. § 
19-2406(7). (Supp. R, pp.197-209.) 
After many rounds of discovery requests and filings with the court, on May 24, 
2011, over two years after Branigh's judgment of conviction was entered, the court 
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commenced an evidentiary hearing5 on Branigh's newest motion for a new trial (Mot. 
Tr., p.24), and subsequently issued an Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion for 
New Trial, denying Branigh's motion. (Supp. R., pp.467-482.) Branigh filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which was denied. (ld., pp.483-484, 517-520.) 
ISSUES 
Branigh's seven issues on appeal are set forth at page 22 of his Appellant's Brief, 
and due to their length, will not be repeated here. 
The state rephrases the issues as follows: 6 
1. Has Branigh failed to establish error in the denial of his suppression motion? 
2. Has Branigh failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court's admission of 
State's Exhibits 32, 33, and 34? 
3. Has Branigh failed to show error in the district court's admission of his text messages 
into evidence? 
4. Has Branigh failed to show fundamental error with respect to his unpreserved claim 
of prosecutorial misconduct? 
5. Has Branigh failed to establish any basis for concluding the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct under Napue? 
6. Has Branigh failed to show that the district court erred in denying his Brady claim? 
7. Has Branigh failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion for a new trial? 
5 Branigh was represented by counsel. 
6 The state has elected not to pursue the cross-appeal it filed in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Branigh Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Prior to trial, Branigh filed a motion in limine seeking "an order barring" the state 
from introducing at trial "any evidence gathered from Sprint Nextel Corporation" 
concerning his cell phone records. (R., vol. II, pp.306-307.) Branigh argues that the 
district court erred in ultimately denying7 his motion to suppress his cell phone records, 
including the content of his text messages, because: (1) based upon I.C.R 41(a), "the 
warrant was unlawfully obtained because the magistrate lacked the authority to issue a 
warrant for premises outside of the judicial district in which the magistrate resided"; (2) 
"the warrant was unlawfully executed because the warrant described the premises to be 
searched as being in Texas, and the warrant was served in Kansas"; and (3) the federal 
statute (18 U.S.C. § 2703)8 "expanded the magistrate's authority to issue a warrant 
outside the State's jurisdiction." (Appellant's Brief, p.26.) 
Branigh's' arguments lack merit. First, whether I.C.R 41 (a) authorized the out-
of-state seizure and resultant search of Branigh's cell phone records is completely 
irrelevant to the question of whether there was probable cause to justify such a search 
under either the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article 1, § 17 
7 After the district court initially granted Branigh's motion to bar the admission of his cell 
phone records on the basis of I.C.R 41(a) (Vol. IV, R, pp.752-757), the state filed a 
motion for reconsideration, asking to court to reverse its ruling based upon the 
Electronic Communication Privacy Act ("ECPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (Vol. IV, R., 
rp·763-771). 
18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. is the "Electronic Communication Privacy Act" ("ECPA"). 
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of the Idaho Constitution.9 Second, the fact that the search warrant incorrectly listed the 
premises to be searched as located in Texas instead of Kansas was an obvious error 
which was readily recognizable by reference to other information contained in the 
search warrant and because the law enforcement officer had knowledge of the correct 
location. Third, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 provided Idaho law enforcement officers with a valid 
means of executing a search warrant on Branigh's out-of-state cell phone service 
provider. Fourth, although the district court ruled otherwise, because Branigh's text 
messages were delivered, like a letter delivered to the addressee, he lost any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in those messages and therefore had no standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of the search and seizure of those messages. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,302, 
9 Branigh correctly notes that Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution is "virtually 
identical to the Fourth Amendment, except that 'oath or affirmation' is termed 'affidavit.'" 
(Appellant's Brief, p.26 (quoting State v. Ramos, 142 Idaho 628, 630, 130 P.3d 1166, 
1168 (Ct. App. 2005).) Branigh does not provide "any cogent reason why our state 
constitution should be applied differently" than the federal constitution. State v. 
Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130,982 P.2d 961,965 (Ct. App. 1999); see Appellant's Brief, 
pp.23-32. Branigh does not cite any textual or structural differences between the 
federal and state constitution, list any matters of particular state interest or local 
concern, public attitudes, or state traditions that might support an argument for 
interpreting Article 1, § 17 differently than the Fourth Amendment. See State v. 
Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504 (1992) (Bistline, J., concurring). 
Therefore, this Court should view the state constitution coextensive with the federal 
constitution for the purpose of considering whether the search warrant issued for 
Branigh's cell phone records violates constitutional provisions, and conclude that it does 
not. 
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160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). Interpretation of court rules is a question of law reviewed de 
novo. See State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,821,965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998). 
C. Even If I.C.R. 41(a) Was Violated, Suppression Is Not Required 
Branigh first contends that because I.C.R. 41(a) "clearly states that the issuing 
court must reside within the judicial district where the property or person to be sought is 
locatedL]" the "issuing magistrates lacked any authority to issue warrants outside their 
judicial districts [and] the warrants were unlawfully obtained." (Appellant's Brief, p.27.) 
However, even assuming, arguendo, a violation of I.C.R. 41(a), Branigh is not entitled to 
suppression of his cell phone records based upon a violation of a state statute or 
criminal rule; such violations do not compel the Fourth Amendment remedy of 
exclusion. 
"Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations." 
United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir. 2006). Application of the exclusionary 
rule is, therefore, "an appropriate sanction for a statutory violation only where the statute 
specifically provides for suppression as a remedy or the statutory violation implicates 
underlying constitutional rights such as the right to be free from unreasonable search 
and seizure." Abdi, 463 F.3d at 556; United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251 
(11 th Cir.1991) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify application of the 
exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right or evidence that 
Congress intended exclusion as a remedy); United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 
960 (6th Cir.1990) (holding that government violations of the Electronic Communications 
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Privacy Act do not warrant suppression of evidence). The legislature has not provided 
for suppression as a remedy for a violation of I.C.R. 41 (a). 
Most importantly, a violation of a state law related to an arrest or a search does 
not rise to the level of constitutional significance. In Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 
(2008), police officers stopped a car driven by Moore. The officers arrested Moore for 
driving on a suspended license, a misdemeanor. kL. at 166. In a search incident to that 
arrest the officers found crack cocaine. kL. at 166-167. Moore moved to suppress the 
evidence resulting from the search by claiming that, under Virginia law, the offense for 
which he was arrested was only citable, and therefore the arrest was illegal. kL. at 167-
168. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed Moore's conviction, reasoning that Moore's 
arrest was illegal under state law, and therefore the search incident to arrest was invalid 
under the Fourth Amendment. kL. at 168. 
After concluding that historical context did not answer this question, the Supreme 
Court of the United States first noted that its precedent under the Fourth Amendment 
had declared that an arrest based on probable cause was constitutionally reasonable, 
and that state law regarding searches and seizures did not change this calculus. 10 kL. at 
171-172. The Court noted that attaching a federal remedy to a state law violation would 
10 Although Moore involved a challenge to an arrest, it also dealt with the attendant 
search incident to that arrest. Moore, 553 U.S. at 177-178. The holding in Moore - that 
probable cause determinations under the Fourth Amendment are to be made without 
regard to state laws - applies not only to arrests, but to all searches and seizures. See 
id., p.171 (as far as the federal Constitution is concerned, "whether state law authorized 
the search [is] irrelevant"); p.173, ("our more recent decisions ... have indicated that 
when States go above the Fourth Amendment minimum, the Constitution's protections 
concerning search and seizure remain the same"); p.176 ("It would be strange to 
construe a constitutional provision that did not apply to the States at all when it was 
adopted to now restrict state officers more than federal officers, solely because the 
States have passed search-and-seizure laws that are the prerogative of independent 
sovereigns. ") 
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thwart states in setting their own policies by mandating suppression when the state itself 
did not. 1.9.:. at 173-174. Basing the constitutional reasonableness of state actions on 
state standards would create a vague and unpredictable constitutional standard. 1.9.:. at 
174-175. It was also undesirable to have a constitutional standard that would vary from 
place to place and time to time. 1.9.:. at 176. "We conclude that warrantless arrests for 
crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the 
Constitution, and that while states are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, 
state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections." 1.9.:. Having found 
the arrest lawful under the Constitutional standards for arrest, the Court also rejected 
the argument that the search incident to arrest was unreasonable because the arrest 
was "unlawful" under state law. 1.9.:. at 177-178. See United States v. Green, 178 F.3d 
1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 1999) (although police officers executed federal search warrant 
outside their jurisdiction, the warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United 
States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that Moore 
applies only to state prosecutions, and affirming that Moore applies to arrests and 
searches and seizures). 
Likewise, in State v. Benefiel, 131 Idaho 226, 953 P.2d 976 (1998), the Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected the claim that suppression of evidence is an appropriate 
remedy where an officer acts outside the physical boundaries of his jurisdiction but does 
not act unconstitutionally. In that case an officer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, while 
off of the tribal reservation, saw Benefiel driving in a way that gave him reason to 
believe he was driving under the influence on an Idaho state highway. 1.9.:. at 227, 953 
P.2d at 977. The officer stopped Benefiel, made contact with him, and, when he 
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discovered additional evidence of DUI called in an ISP officer. kl Benefiel argued that 
the officer lacked authority to stop him. kl at 228, 953 P.2d at 978. The supreme court, 
however, found that to be irrelevant. Id. Because the stop was supported by 
reasonable suspicion, and therefore met constitutional standards, there was no violation 
of Benefiel's constitutional rights and therefore no suppression. kl at 229, 953 P.2d at 
979. 
The analysis in Moore and Benefiel applies here. In order for a search warrant to 
be valid, it must be supported by probable cause to believe that evidence or fruits of a 
crime may be found in a particular place. State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 792-93, 
852 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (1993). There is no dispute in this case that the search 
warrant was based upon probable cause. Thus, in this case the search warrant was 
constitutionally reasonable regardless of whether there was compliance with I.C.R. 
41 (a). Benefiel, 131 Idaho at 229, 953 P.2d at 979. As in Moore, the state law did not 
alter the constitutional standard of reasonableness. 
As shown above, Branigh was not entitled to suppression for a violation of a state 
law, and there was no constitutional violation because the search warrant was 
supported by probable cause. Thus, the district court's denial of Branigh's motion to 
suppress (presented as a motion in limine; see R., pp.306-307) was correct, although 
on different grounds, and should be upheld on this alternative basis. State v. Stewart, 
149 Idaho 383, 234 P.3d 707, 712 (2010) (affirming denial of motion on correct theory, 
one not reached by trial court); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 
149 (1999) (if trial court reaches the correct result by incorrect theory, appellate court 
will affirm upon the correct theory). 
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D. The Search Warrant Description Of The Premises Met The Particularity 
Requirement For A Search Warrant 
Two search warrants were served by fax on Sprint Nextel; the first search 
warrant obtained "printouts of all incoming and outgoing text messages," and "the call 
detail records to include all incoming and outgoing calls" for Branigh's cell phone 
number "for the period of 09-01-2007 until 10-02-07." (R., vol. II, p.320.) The second 
search warrant obtained the subscriber information, and a certification/authentication 
letter on all the records provided (by both search warrants) in regard to Branigh's cell 
phone during the same time frame. (Vol. II, R. p.331.) Both search warrants listed the 
premises to be served as follows: 
Sprint Nextel Corporate Security, Subpoena Compliance, located at 6480 
Sprint Parkway in Overland Park, Texas (Fax #913-315-0736). 
(R., vol. II, pp.320, 331.) 
One of the suppression grounds cited by Branigh was that the search warrant for 
his cell phone records incorrectly listed the place to be searched as located in Overland 
Park, Texas, instead of Overland Park, Kansas. (R., vol. II, pp.306-307, 316; Vol. VI, 
R., pp.1195-1203.) Although the district court initially issued an order granting Branigh's 
motion to bar the admission of his cell phone records on the basis of I.C.R. 41(a), that 
order took judicial notice that the area code listed for the fax number of the Sprint Nextel 
office in Overland Park, Texas, "includes Overland Park, Kansas." (R., vol. IV, p.755 
n.2.) After the state filed a motion for reconsideration, the court denied Branigh's 
suppression motion on the basis that 18 U.S.C. § 2703 permitted the magistrate to 
issue a search warrant for cell phone records stored or held by an out-of-state cell 
phone provider. (Tr. p.231, Ls.10-25.) During trial, Branigh again objected to the 
18 
admission of his cell phone records, which the court overruled on the same grounds 
upon which it previously denied his motion in limine. (R., vol. IV, p.801, L.6 - p.802, 
L.12; p.832, Ls.17-22.) On appeal, Branigh argues that, "[b]ecause the warrants 
described the premises to be searched as being in Texas, and the warrants were 
served in Kansas, they were unlawfully executed." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Branigh's 
argument is not compelling. 
"Both the federal constitution and the constitution of Idaho mandate particularity 
in the description of the place to be searched." State v. Schanefelt, 115 Idaho 129, 130, 
765 P.2d 154, 155 (Ct. App. 1988). The purpose of the particularity requirement is to 
minimize the risk that officers will search in a place other than that intended by the judge 
who issued the warrant. 
The applicable test for determining the sufficient degree of particularity is 
whether "the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort 
ascertain and identify the place intended." This Court has expanded on 
this test: "The description must be sufficiently clear so that the property to 
be searched is recognizable from other neighboring properties." 
State v. Carlson, 101 Idaho 598, 599, 618 P.2d 776, 777 (1980) (citations omitted). The 
warrant is to be interpreted in a commonsense and realistic fashion." State v. Sapp, 
110 Idaho 153, 155, 715 P.2d 366, 369 (Ct. App. 1986). "Defects or omissions that do 
not affect the likelihood of an erroneous search are to be ignored." State v. O'Keefe, 
143 Idaho 278, 286, 141 P.3d 1147, 1155 (Ct. App. 2006). 
In its initial order granting Branigh's motion in limine to suppress his cell phone 
records, the district court took judicial notice that the area code listed in the search 
warrants (913) included Overland Park, Kansas, and, inferentially, not Texas. (R., vol. 
IV, p.755, n.2.) Therefore, since the correct state was readily ascertainable from the 
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face of the search warrants themselves, they met the particularity requirement. In 
contrast, in State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 653, 534 P.2d 771, 773 (1975), the Idaho 
Supreme Court directed the trial court to enter an order granting suppression because, 
U[i]n the facts at bar the only distinguishable description contained in the warrant and 
supporting affidavit was the house number[,]" and the record was "uncontradicted that 
the number was incorrect." Several cases subsequent to Yoder establish that an 
erroneous address is not fatal if there is an otherwise adequate description of the place 
to be searched. State v. Hart, 100 Idaho 137, 594 P.2d 647 (1979) (wrong number in 
address did not invalidate warrant); State v. Carlson, 101 Idaho 598, 618 P.2d 776 
(1980) (misnaming of road did not invalidate warrant); Schanefelt, 115 Idaho 129, 765 
P.2d 154 (numerically incorrect address did not invalidate warrant); Huck v. State, 124 
Idaho 155, 857 P.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1993) (wrong road name did not invalidate warrant); 
see also State v. Young, 136 Idaho 711, 39 P.3d 651 (Ct. App. 2002) (search warrant 
upheld despite incorrect physical description of premises where address was correct 
and executing officer had knowledge of location from prior visits). As the district court 
appears to have found, the area code of the fax address for Sprint Nextel established 
the premises described with such particularity that it could be distinguished from other 
properties despite the mistaken "Texas" reference. 
Moreover, because the search warrants issued were for Branigh's cell phone 
records and were served on his cell phone provider, Sprint Nextel, by fax, there was no 
chance that the mistake of naming Texas as the state where the premises were located 
could result in a search of the wrong premises. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho at 286, 141 P.3d at 
1155. The search warrants sought specialized information from Branigh's cell phone 
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provider, and any other entity (or person) receiving such a request would not - and 
could not - have complied. Moreover, by serving the search warrants by fax instead of 
in-person, there was no way the error in Sprint Nextel's physical address could have 
affected the accuracy of service of the search warrants to Sprint Nextel's fax number. 
There was simply no likelihood of an erroneous search. Branigh has failed to 
demonstrate that the defect in the search warrants affected "the likelihood of an 
erroneous search[,]" and should not be ignored. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho at 286, 141 P.3d at 
1155; Schaffer, 112 Idaho at 1027, 739 P.2d at 326. 
E. The District Court Correctly Determined That The Search Warrant For Sprint-
Nextel Text Messages Was Valid Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703 
After the district court initially granted Branigh's motion in limine to exclude text 
messages obtained by a search warrant served on Sprint-Nextel at an out-of-state 
(Kansas) electronic information storage facility (Vol. IV, Tr., pp.752-757), the prosecutor 
filed a motion for reconsideration with a supporting brief (id., pp.763-771). Upon 
reviewing the authority presented - namely, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), part of the Stored 
Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.) - the court reversed its decision and 
ruled that the issuance and execution of the search warrant for Branigh's cell phone 
records was valid under the federal statute, and, contingent upon the state laying a 
proper foundation, the phone records would be admitted at trial. (Tr., vol. 1, p.229, L.16 
- p.231, L.25.) Branigh claims on appeal that "the district court erred by concluding that 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) expanded the authority of an Idaho court to issue a warrant beyond 
that which is provided by Idaho lawL]" and that I.C.R. 41 (a) precludes Idaho 
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magistrate's from exercising jurisdiction outside Idaho.11 (Appellant's Brief, pp.23-32.) 
Branigh's argument falls short. 
In In the Matter of the Search of Yahoo, Inc., 2007 WL 1539971 *3 (D. Ariz. 
2007), the federal district court explained the status of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) in 2007, the 
time relevant to Branigh's case: 
Section 220 of the USA Patriot Act, entitled "Nationwide Service of 
Search Warrants for Electronic Evidence," amended § 2703(a) so it now 
provides that: 
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a 
provider of electronic communication service of the contents 
of a wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic 
storage in an electronic communications system for one 
hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant 
issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the 
offense under investigation or equivalent State warrant. 
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (emphasis added), as amended by PL 107-56 
(HR 3162),2001. 
(Underscore added.) Apart from generally requiring phone service providers to disclose 
the contents of stored electronic communications if served with a timely and appropriate 
warrant, there are four significant aspects to the amended version of 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(a). First, the title of the amendment makes it clear that the statute relates to 
"nationwide service" of search warrants for electronic evidence, not simply for service of 
such warrants within a court's own territorial area of jurisdiction. Second, "[a] 
governmental entity" encompasses both state and federal governmental entities. Third, 
11 I.C.R. 41(a) reads: 
(a) Authority to Issue Warrant. A search warrant authorized by this rule 
may be issued by a district judge or magistrate within the judicial district 
wherein the property or person sought is located upon request of a law 
enforcement officer or any attorney for the state of Idaho. 
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by permitting "a court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation" to issue a 
search warrant for stored electronic communications, the statute indicates that it is 
authorizing the service of such search warrants in extra-jurisdictional locales. Fourth, 
search warrants for extra-jurisdictional locations can be state warrants, as long as they 
are equivalent to warrants obtained under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Branigh's complaint that the federal statute cannot increase the jurisdiction of an 
Idaho magistrate (see I.C.R. 41 (a)) is misplaced. It is the federal statute -- not an Idaho 
magistrate -- that legally obligates out-of-state service providers to disclose stored 
electronic data to state law enforcement officers named in state search warrants 
(equivalent to warrants under the federal rules). The state search warrant is not, by 
itself, legally binding; instead, it triggers compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
Arguments analogous to Branigh's have been repeatedly made, unsuccessfully, with 
regard to Federal Criminal Rule 41 (b ).12 As explained in the recent decision of United 
States v. McVicker, 2012 OS 860412 *2, n.1 (D. Or. 2012): 
Several courts have interpreted § 2703(a) as authorizing a federal court in 
the district where an alleged crime occurred to issue warrants to seize 
electronically stored communications located in other districts. They have 
contrasted this authority with the different and distinct authority under Rule 
41(b) for federal courts to issue warrants for the search and seizure of 
evidence located within their districts. See, e.g., United States v. Berkos, 
546 F.3d 392, 397-98 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Kemell, 2010 WL 
1408437, *4 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 2, 2010), report and recommendation 
adopted by 2010 WL 1491861, *3-5 (Apr. 13, 2010); In re Search of 
Yahoo, Inc., 2007 WL 1539971 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007); In re Search 
Warrant, 2005 WL 3844032, *5-6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2006). Thus 
Congress - and the courts, in interpreting congressional intent - has 
distinguished between courts with territorial jurisdiction over an alleged 
crime and courts with the authority under Rule 41 (b) to issue warrants for 
12 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (b) states, "a magistrate judge with authority in 
the district ... has authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or 
property located within the district." 
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searches to be conducted within their districts. This distinction refutes Mr. 
McVicker's argument that a court must have territorial jurisdiction before it 
can issue a search warrant under Rule 41. 
Further, in Hubbardv. MySpace, Inc., 788 F.Supp.2d 319, 325-326 (S.D. N.Y. 
2011) (footnotes omitted), the federal district court explained that, under 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(a), not only are federal magistrate judges permitted to issue out-of-district search 
warrants, but state warrants also fall under the provisions of that statute, stating: 
Congress made clear that, in adopting the relevant statutory 
language, it specifically intended to allow federal courts to authorize 
searches beyond their normal jurisdiction: .... 
Thus, even though federal magistrate judges typically may issue 
warrants only for searches within their districts, extraterritorial warrants are 
permissible for purposes of Section 2703(a). 
Plaintiff concedes as much. He nevertheless contends that state -
as opposed to federal- warrants do not satisfy Section 2703(a) where the 
issuing court exceeds its ordinary territorial authority. The Court 
disagrees. If federal warrants satisfy Section 2703(a) in these 
circumstances, the same ought to be true of equivalent state warrants ... 
It bears clarifying that Section 2703(a) does not impermissibly 
expand the power of Georgia magistrates or any other courts. 
The above authorities support the view that, regardless of territorial jurisdiction by 
either a state or federal magistrate (or judge), "extraterritorial warrants are permissible 
for purposes of Section 2703(a)." lQ" In addition, the state relies upon the state's Brief 
in Support of State's Motion for Reconsideration (Vol. IV, Tr., pp.765-771), attached as 
Appendix A, and incorporated as if fully set forth herein. Branigh has failed to 
demonstrate any error in the district court's decision denying his motion in limine to 
suppress the phone records obtained through the search warrant served on Sprint-
Nextel. 
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F. The District Court's Denial Of Branigh's Suppression Motion Should Also Be 
Affirmed On The Basis That Branigh Lacked Standing To Challenge The Search 
Of His Out-Of-State Stored Records Of His Cell Phone 
In its brief in support of its motion for reconsideration of the district court's initial 
decision to suppress Branigh's out-of-state cell phone records, the state argued that 
Branigh lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in those records because, like 
letters, after his text messages were opened or received, he lost any expectation of 
privacy he might have otherwise had. (R., vol. IV, pp.3-6.) The district court disagreed, 
relying in part on Quon v. Arch Wireless Operation Company, 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 
2007). (Tr., vol. 1, p.229, L.16 - p.231, L.1.) However, Quon was later reversed and 
remanded by the United States Supreme Court in City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 
_ U.S. __ , 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010), in which the Supreme Court specifically 
stated it was not deciding, only assuming for present purposes, that "Quon had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager provided to 
him by the City[.]" 
Although the district court's decision to deny Branigh's motion to suppress his 
cell phone records was not based upon a finding that Branigh lacked standing under the 
Fourth Amendment to challenge the search, its denial order should be upheld on that 
basis. See State v. White, 102 Idaho 924, 925,644 P.2d 318, 319 (1982) ("This Court 
has held that where a ruling is correct it is immaterial that the reason given by the trial 
court for admitting the evidence may have been incorrect."); State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 
448,450,807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate review, the lower court's 
ruling must be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on any theory). Inasmuch as the 
"standing" issue has been adequately briefed below, the state relies on the Brief in 
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Support of State's Motion for Reconsideration (Vol. IV, Tr., pp.765-771), attached as 
Appendix A, and incorporated as if fully set forth herein, for its argument that the district 
court's order denying Branigh's motion to suppress his out-of-state cell phone records 
obtained pursuant to a search warrant should be affirmed on the ground that Branigh 
has no standing to mount such a challenge under the Fourth Amendment. 
II. 
Branigh Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's Admission 
Of State's Exhibits 32, 33, and 34 
A. Introduction 
Branigh asserts the district court erred "by admitting State's Exhibits 32, 33, and 
34 because their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.,,13 (Appellant's Brief, p.32.) He claims the exhibits had little relevance and 
the only effect they would have had "was to appeal to the jury's passion by creating 
sympathy for Mr. Johnston because of the state he was in when the photographs were 
taken." (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) Branigh's arguments are without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo, but other questions of admissibility 
of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 
264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 3 
(1997). In reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion, an appellate court 
determines whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one involving the 
13 The photographs were taken in the St. Joseph's Hospital Emergency Room in 
Lewiston. (Tr., vol. 1, p.645, L.1 - p.647, L.7.) State's Exhibit 32 depicts a wound to 
Mike Johnston's right shoulder, State's Exhibit 33 shows a chest wound, and State's 
Exhibit's 34 is a photo of the chest drainage tube. (Id.) 
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exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices it had; and (3) 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37,43 
P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Powell, 125 Idaho 889, 891, 876 P.2d 
587,589 (1994)). 
C. Branigh Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Admitting The Three Photographs 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." !.R.E. 401. Unless otherwise excluded by the 
Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence is admissible. I.R.E. 402. Evidence is relevant if 
it is necessary to tell the complete story of the circumstances of a crime. State v. Izatt, 
96 Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1975); State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17-
19,878 P.2d 188, 191-193 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Branigh does not appear to contend that the three photographs have no 
relevance. Indeed, the photos are relevant to show the nature and extent of Mike 
Johnston's injuries and to corroborate and illustrate the emergency room physician's 
testimony, making it easier for the jury to understand his observations and conclusions. 
See State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 402, 958 P.2d 22, 28 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. 
Peters, 116 Idaho 851, 853-854, 780 P.2d 602, 604-605 (Ct. App. 1989). Dr. Hunter 
testified that State's Exhibits 32 and 33 accurately showed Mike Johnston's wounds 
when he was brought to the emergency room, and State's Exhibit 34 was an accurate 
photograph of the chest drainage tube he inserted into Mike Johnston that evening. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.646, L.15 - p.647, L.7.) The three photographs helped Dr. Hunter explain 
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to the jury, through visual means, the condition Mike Johnston was in after he arrived at 
the emergency room, and how Dr. Hunter unsuccessfully attempted to save his life. 
(Tr., vol. 1,648, L.4 - p.651, LA.) 
Instead of arguing that the three exhibits had no relevance, Branigh argues that 
because he did not contest the fact that Mike Johnston bled to death due to a gunshot 
wound, the three photos had such little relevance, they should not have been admitted. 
He states: 
However, any relevance to these exhibits was extremely low. There was 
no dispute in this case that Mr. Johnston was shot in the chest and there 
was no dispute that the wounds caused his death. The coroner testified, 
without objection, to those conclusions. The only contested issue in this 
case was whether Mr. Branigh was the shooter. These photographs 
contribute nothing to this issue. The photographs, of bloody bullet wounds 
and a chest tube full of blood, were unfairly prejudicial because they had 
no effect other to [sic] appeal to the jury's sympathy. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.33. 14) Branigh's argument has no basis in law. That a defendant is 
"not disputing" certain facts does not make those facts or evidence establishing them 
irrelevant. The state bore the burden of proving this crime. Although Branigh does not 
dispute that the person examined by Dr. Hunter in the emergency room was Mike 
Johnston, and that the injuries Dr. Hunter observed caused Mike Johnston's death, 
those were facts relevant to the determination of this case, whether "disputed" or not. A 
defendant cannot prevent the state from proving its case by evidence even with a 
stipulation. State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 86-87, 253 P.3d 754, 760-761 (Ct.App. 2011). 
14 Branigh offers no showing from the record that the facts demonstrated by the 
evidence at issue were "undisputed." The defense offered no stipulations to those facts. 
Branigh's argument is apparently that, because he offered no evidence to refute the 
state's evidence, the state's evidence was undisputed and therefore irrelevant. 
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Branigh's argument that the evidence was rendered "irrelevant" because it went to 
"undisputed" facts is without merit. 
Branigh next argues that, although the district court "appears to have perceived 
the issue as one of discretion, ... [it] failed to reach its conclusion through an exercise 
of reason." (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) However, the district court did exercise reason, as 
evidenced by its determination that, under I.RE. 403, although the photos had "some 
prejudicial impact, ... the probative value [was] sufficient" to admit them into evidence. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.647, Ls.21-25.) The district court necessarily exercised reason in reaching 
its determination that, although the three photos had some prejudicial impact, their 
probative value was still sufficient, under Rule 403, to admit them. The court's 
comments showed it engaged in the weighing process required by I.RE. 403 to 
determine whether the probative value of the evidence was "substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice [etc.]." I.RE. 403. 
Finally, Branigh alleges, "[t]he only effect the photographs would have had was to 
appeal to the jury's passion by creating sympathy for Mike Johnston because of the 
state he was in when the photographs were taken." (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) Although 
State's Exhibits 32 and 33 show bullet wounds to Mike Johnston's body, they are not so 
intensely graphic that they would have caused a juror to decide the case based on an 
emotional response to them. The fact that photographs depict the body of a victim and 
the wounds inflicted on the victim and may tend to excite the emotions of the jury does 
not mandate their exclusion from evidence. State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 853, 828 
P.2d 879, 882 (1992); Hawkins, 131 Idaho at 402, 958 P.2d at 28. Rather, the trial 
court must exercise its discretion by balancing the probative value of possibly 
29 
inflammatory evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice. Winn, 121 Idaho at 853, 828 
P.2d at 882. Although the district court did not specifically describe how graphic and 
emotionally upsetting State's Exhibits 32, 33, and 34 appeared to be, a review of those 
photographs does not reveal anything that would evoke more than a normal emotional 
response to photographs of a body with bullet wounds, or a chest drainage tube. It is 
apparent the district court was conscious of the danger of unfair prejudice posed by the 
nature of the photographs, but, after weighing that danger against the probative value of 
the evidence, appropriately admitted them to assist the physician's testimony. There 
was no abuse of discretion. 
III. 
Branigh Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Admission Of His Text 
Messages Into Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Branigh contends the district court erred by admitting cell phone records (State's 
Exhibits 4 and 64) of his text messages without first determining, under I.R.E. 404(b) 
and the two-tiered analysis of State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009), 
whether (1) the text messages "occurred, and that the defendant was the actor," and (2) 
the "danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the 
evidence." (Appellant's Brief, pp.35-36.) 
Branigh has failed to show any error in the district court's admission of State's 
Exhibits 4 and 64 because: (1) he failed to point out any particular text messages that 
were subject to Rule 404(b), (2) the question of whether the text messages were real 
acts committed by Branigh was not placed squarely before the district court, therefore it 
was not required to make specific findings on the issue, (3) the district court did, in fact, 
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determine that, under !.R.E. 403, the text messages' probative value was not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the 
jury, and (4) even if the district court erred in admitting State's Exhibits 4 and 64, such 
error was harmless. 15 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209,218,245 P.3d 961,970 (2010) (citations omitted). 
C. Factual Background On Admission Of State's Exhibits 4 And 64 
Prior to trial, Branigh filed a second motion in limine, in which he sought a ruling 
to preclude the prosecutor from referring to any past crimes, wrongs, or acts unless the 
trial court gave permission, outside the jury's presence, to do so. (R., vol. III, pp.531-
532.) The motion made no mention of any specific evidence. (ld.) During a pre-trial 
motions hearing, both parties agreed to the proposed procedure without identifying any 
specific evidence that might fall under Rule 404(b). (Tr., vol. 1, p.182, L.2-p.183, L.1.) 
During trial, the state moved to admit State's Exhibit 4, text messages on Desiree 
Anderson's cell phone, and Branigh objected on several grounds, explaining in part, 
"[s]ome of these are 404(b) and also Rule 403, the probative value of these far out 
weigh [sic] -- is far out weighed [sic] by prejudicial value. Every one of these messages 
is different, Your Honor." (Tr., vol. 1, p.512, Ls.3-9.) The court initially sustained 
Branigh's objection on foundational grounds (Tr., vol. 1, p.512, Ls.10-13), but after 
15 Inasmuch as Branigh's argument that State's Exhibits 4 and 64 were not admissible 
under Rule 404(b) is solely based on the assertion that the district court failed to 
conduct the two-tier analysis required by Grist, the state will not address whether the 
two exhibits otherwise met the requirements for admission under Rule 404(b). 
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Desiree Anderson provided more information about the text messages, the court 
admitted the exhibit (Tr., vol. 1, p.514, L.17 - p.515, L.19), explaining: 
As to the Rule 403 objection that the probative value is out weighed 
[sic] by the prejudicial impact, I'm going to overrule the Rule 403 objection. 
I've also not been cited anything particular for 404(b) nature, so that 
objection is also overruled. And Exhibit 4 will be admitted at this time. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.515, Ls.17-19.) 
In regard to State's Exhibit 64, Ryan Harger, a custodian of records and 
supervisor of electronic surveillance with Sprint Nextel, testified that it was comprised of 
text messages stored on Branigh's cell phone account over a twelve-day period, which 
he provided to the Lewiston Police Department pursuant to a search warrant. (Tr., vol. 
1, p.788, L.19 - p.797, L.10.) The text messages cover the period from September 20, 
2007, through October 2, 2007. (St. Ex. 64.) After the prosecutor moved to admit 
State's Exhibit 64, Branigh objected on the basis of I.R.E. 403 and 404(b), contending, 
inter alia, "that the prejudicial value far outweighs the probative value, Your Honor." 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.803, L.19 - p. 804, L.18.) The district court admitted State's Exhibit 64 
into evidence, ruling: 
Well, I'm going to overrule the objection first of all on the grounds 
previously raised and I'll also overrule the objection pursuant to Rule 403. 
I don't believe that [sic] probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusing or misleading the jury. And I'm also 
going to overrule the objection under Rule 404(b) and State's Exhibit 64 is 
admitted. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.804, Ls.19-25.) 
D. The District Court Correctly Denied Branigh's Rule 404(b) Objection To His Text 
Messages Because He Failed To Specify Which Messages Fell Under The Rule 
Branigh failed to advise the district court which text messages in State's Exhibits 
4 and 64 were subject to Rule 404(b), nor has he done so on appeal. (See Appellant's 
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Brief, pp.35-37.) State's Exhibit 4 contains 68 pages of photographs of 68 text 
messages from Branigh to Desiree Anderson, taken from her cell phone, which were 
received on September 22, 2007, and October 1, 2007. (See generally St. Ex. 4.) 
State's Exhibit 64 is Branigh's cell phone records, including numerous text messages 
between Branigh, Mike Johnston, and Desiree Anderson, which occurred from 
September 20, 2007, through October 2, 2007. (See generally St. Ex. 64.) 
The admission of State's Exhibits 4 and 64 should be upheld on the ground that 
Branigh failed to identify which text messages fell under Rule 404(b). Without knowing 
which specific text messages were allegedly subject to Rule 404(b), the district court 
simply could not have determined whether a text message was within the scope of Rule 
404(b), was relevant for any of the purposes allowed under the rule, and, if within the 
scope of the rule and relevant, whether the probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, the district court correctly 
overruled Branigh's objections to the admission of State's Exhibits 4 and 64 because 
the court had "not been cited anything particular for 404(b) nature.,,16 (Tr., vol. 1, p.515, 
Ls.17-19.) 
16 Although the district court did not expressly make the same determination in regard 
to State's Exhibit 64, because Branigh also failed to advise the court which particular 
text messages in that exhibit were subject to Rule 404(b), the decision to admit them 
into evidence should be upheld. See State v. White, 102 Idaho 924,925,644 P.2d 318, 
319 (1982) ("This Court has held that where a ruling is correct it is immaterial that the 
reason given by the trial court for admitting the evidence may have been incorrect."); 
State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 448,450,807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate 
review, the lower court's ruling must be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on any 
theory). 
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E. Because The Question Of Whether The Text Messages Were Actual Acts 
Committed By Branigh Was Not Placed Squarely Before The District Court, 
Branigh Has Failed To Show Error In Any Lack Of Specific Findings On The 
Issue 
Branigh contends the district court failed to comply with the first tier analysis 
required by Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185, by determining whether the text 
messages "occurred, and that the defendant was the actor." (Appellant's Brief, pp.35-
36.) However, under State v. Cooke, 149 Idaho 233, 239-240, 233 P.3d 164, 170-171 
(Ct. App. 2010), because Branigh failed to squarely present that issue before the district 
court, the court was not required to make such specific finding. 
In Cooke, the Idaho Court of Appeals considered essentially the same argument 
Branigh advances. Cooke, 149 Idaho at 238-242, 233 P.3d at 169-173. The Court 
explained that, "[i]n [State v.] Parmer, [147 Idaho 210,207 P.3d 186 Ct. App. 2009)], we 
interpreted the Idaho Supreme Court opinion in Grist to require that in determining 
I.R.E. 404(b) relevancy a trial court must articulate a separate finding that sufficient 
evidence exists to support a reasonable conclusion that the other crime, wrong, or act 
occurred." .!s!:., 149 Idaho at 239, 233 P.3d at 170. However, "[a]bsent the issue being 
brought to the district court's attention" there is "no need for the district court to 
specifically articulate its determination on the record." .!s!:., 149 Idaho at 240, 233 P.3d at 
171. 
Similar to the "threats" at issue under Rule 404(b) in Cooke, Branigh did not 
object to the admission of State's Exhibits 4 and 64 on the basis that the text messages 
were not shown to have been made by him. (See Tr., vol. 1, p.514 L.19 - p.515, L.21; 
p.803, L.19 - p.804, L.25.) Because "Parmer's 'specific articulation' requirement only 
applies when the record on appeal shows the issue was squarely before the trial 
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court[,]" Cooke, 149 Idaho at 240, 233 P.3d at 171, the district court in Branigh's case 
was not obligated to make specific findings about the first tier analysis of Grist. 
Moreover, as stated in Cooke, even though the district court did not articulate the 
first tier analysis required by Grist, there was "substantial and competent evidence to 
support a finding that there was sufficient evidence by which a jury could reasonably 
conclude [Branigh] made the [text messages]." Cooke, 149 Idaho 240, 233 P.3d at 172. 
The foundation laid for the admission of State's Exhibits 4 (by Desiree Anderson) and 
64 (by Ryan Harger) provided "substantial and competent evidence to support the lower 
court's unarticulated finding" that the text messages actually occurred, and that Branigh 
made them. kL (see Tr., vol. 1, p.510, L.2 - p.514, L.16; p.788, L.19 - p.797, L.12; 
p.902, L.19 - p.803, L.1; State's Exhibits 4,64). 
F. Branigh Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's Determination 
That The Probative Value Of State's Exhibits 4 And 64 Was Not Substantially 
Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice 
Contrary to Branigh's argument, the district court did, in fact, determine that, 
under I.R.E. 403, the probative value of the text messages of both State's Exhibits 4 
and 64 was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or 
misleading the jury. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.35-37.) Branigh's assertion that the 
district court failed to analyze whether the "danger of unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence" (Appellant's Brief, p.36) is plainly 
disproven by the record. 
As noted, when the district court admitted State's Exhibit 4, it stated: 
As to the Rule 403 objection that the probative value is out weighed 
[sic] by the prejudicial impact, I'm going to overrule the Rule 403 objection. 
I've also not been cited anything particular for 404(b) nature, so that 
objection is also overruled. And Exhibit 4 will be admitted at this time. 
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(Tr., vol. 1, p.515, Ls.17-19.) Likewise, in making its determination that State's Exhibit 
64 would be admitted, the district court stated: 
Well, I'm going to overrule the objection first of all on the grounds 
previously raised and I'll also overrule the objection pursuant to Rule 403. 
I don't believe that probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusing, or misleading the jury. And I'm also 
going to overrule the objection under Rule 404(b) and State's Exhibit 64 is 
admitted. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.804, Ls.19-25.) The record shows the district court conducted a 403 
balancing analysis before admitting State's Exhibits 4 and 64. 
Nothing in the Grist opinion mandates the conclusion, suggested by Branigh, that 
a trial court errs as a matter of law by failing to articulate the bases of a Rule 403 
determination on the record. In this case, the district court admitted the state's proffered 
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and, in so doing, specifically stated that its probative value was 
not outweighed by its potential prejudice. That the court did not expressly say what the 
evidence was relevant to prove or what its potential prejudice was does not show error. 
G. Even If The District Court Erred In Its Evidentiary Rulings. Such Error Is 
Harmless 
Even were this Court to conclude that the district court abused its discretion by 
not performing the proper Rule 403 balancing test, any such abuse would constitute 
harmless error. Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. "The 
inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the 
defendant] even without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 
148 Idaho 664,669,227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18,24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999». 
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Even if the district court erred in permitting the introduction of State's Exhibits 4 
and 64, such error is harmless because State's Exhibits 60 and 61 were also admitted 
at trial. State's Exhibit 60 is a compilation from Sprint Nextel records of text messages 
between Branigh and Mike Johnston from September 30, 2007 until moments before 
Johnston was shot on October 1, 2007. State's Exhibit 61 is a compilation from Sprint 
Nextel records of text messages between Branigh and Desiree Anderson from 5:00 
a.m. until 10:09 p.m. on October 1,2007, just before the shooting occurred. (Tr., vol. 1, 
p.825, L.20 - p.832, ,L.23; St. Exs. 60, 61.) 
The text messages reveal that Branigh was becoming increasingly angry and 
demanding because Desiree Anderson had ended their relationship in favor of seeing 
Mike Johnston. In his text messages to Desiree Anderson, Branigh insisted she meet 
with him to talk, spoke of his willingness to sacrifice himself; stated that he did not care 
about "dead bodies in old graves," said death was an honor, and texted that "mks done 
u wont talk 2 me, so I swear it on ur kids' lives, mks done[.]" (St. Ex. 61.) Branigh's text 
messages to Mike Johnston were increasingly insulting and threatening, culminating 
with him calling Mike a coward and challenging Mike to meet him by texting "come on" 
and "u comin" shortly before Mike was murdered. (State's Exhibit 60, pp.9-11.) 
State's Exhibits 60 and 61 reflect Branigh's increasing animus toward Mike 
Johnston for winning the affections of Desiree Anderson. Additionally, the text 
messages provided the jury with a time trail showing Branigh was meeting Mike 
Johnston to engage in some type of altercation just prior to Mike Johnston's murder. 
(See St. Ex. 60.) There is nothing in State's Exhibits 4 and 64 that could be deemed 
harmful to Branigh's case beyond the incriminating nature of the evidence presented in 
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his text messages from State's Exhibits 60 and 61. That information, either alone or in 
combination with the other testimony and evidence presented at trial, as set forth in the 
Statement of Facts, supra, demonstrates that any error in the admission of State's 
Exhibits 4 and 64 was harmless because this Court can say, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that absent the error, the outcome of Branigh's jury trial would not have been 
different. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669, 227 P.3d at 923; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
IV. 
Branigh Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His Unpreserved 
Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
During trial, Lewiston Police Officer Brian Birdsell testified that Branigh, his car, 
and his glasses, were not subjected to gun powder residue collection or testing because 
the state lab does not test gun powder residue. (Tr., vol. 1, p.780, L.20 - p. 781, L.24.) 
Additionally, Detective Larry Stuck testified that, on the night of the murder, he went to 
the hospital and examined the gunshot wounds on Mike Johnston's body. (Tr., vol. 2, 
p.953, L.22 - p.954, L.4.) Detective Stuck, who had had some training in recognizing 
gun powder burns or residue, but was not a GSR expert, testified that he observed gun 
powder residue on one of the wounds. (Tr., vol. 2, p.953, L.22 - p.974, L.12.) When 
Branigh asked what it meant "if gun powder residue is attached to a wound?", Detective 
Stuck stated: 
Well, it can mean several things based on my training and 
experience. ... My observations in this report are cursory observations 
and initial observations. Basically there may be a blackening around the 
wound or what they call tattooing where the gun powder will be embedded 
into the skin. 
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(Tr., vol. 2, p.956, L.11-16.) When Branigh asked the detective if he had any idea of 
"the distance that a gun would have to be from someone to do that?", he said he did 
not. (Tr., vol. 2, p.956, Ls.17-19.) 
In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury: 
The Defendant is likely to make a big deal of the fact that there was 
no gun shot residue testing done. But if you will recall, Lieutenant Birdsell 
told you the Lab doesn't do those any more. In fact, the FBI doesn't do 
them any more because they are not reliable. They don't tend to prove 
anything. They result in false positive. If you find evidence of gun shot, all 
that says is that at some time in the past there was a gun fired. You can't 
identify the gun, when it was, anything like that. And so they have taken 
the position they will no longer do the testing. 
So the fact that there is the potential to do things, and in this case 
there wasn't, but if there is a potential to do things that you might see on 
CSI, you know, did we do a DNA analysis on the blood drops on the 
sidewalk, no. 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.1023, L.25-p.1024, L.13.) 
During rebuttal argument, the prosecutor told the jury that gunshot residue 
evidence would not have been helpful because Branigh had one hour and 40 minutes 
from the time of the murder until the chase started in which to have washed his hands to 
eliminate any trace of gunshot residue. (Tr., vol. 2, p.1039, L.19-25.) The prosecutor 
further explained that gunshot residue from other sources - such as officers who helped 
take Branigh into custody and who had fired shots at Branigh's tires -- could have been 
found on Branigh, which would have made testing pointless as far as proving anything. 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.1039, L.25 - p.1040, L.10.) The prosecutor then stated: 
There is no way that we could have introduced evidence to say that 
that was a result of the revolver that he used to kill Michael Johnston any 
more than it was evidence that it was GSR transfer from all the - well, as 
a matter of fact, I mean here's a - every officer in every car has got gun 
shot residue sitting around. I mean it just becomes a mess. Everyone of 
them takes qualification practice, their guns have it on them. They handle 
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their guns. All of them have their guns drawn at this time. The weapons 
that are in their car have gun shot residue. Its just - you know, it's just 
unreliable evidence. So it would not have proven anything for the 
Defendant regardless of what he says. 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.1040, LS.11- 22.) 
For the first time on appeal, Branigh argues that the prosecutor's closing and 
rebuttal arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct and fundamental error. He 
contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing facts about gunshot 
residue ("GSR") not in evidence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.37-40.) A review of the 
challenged remarks shows no misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes 
fundamental error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 
2010). In the absence of an objection, "the appellate court's authority to remedy that 
error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being 
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a fair 
tribunal." Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 P.3d at 976. Review without objection will not 
lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or 
obvious" on the record, "without the need for any additional information" including 
information "as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the 
"defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights," 
generally by showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the 
trial proceedings." !sL at _,245 P.3d at 978. 
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C. Branigh Has Failed To Show Prosecutorial Misconduct Amounting To 
Fundamental Error 
Branigh argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of 
fundamental error by arguing during closing argument facts about gunshot residue that 
were not in evidence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.37-40.) A prosecutor has considerable 
latitude in closing argument. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 
(2009); State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v. Priest, 
128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P .2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995). He or she is entitled to argue all 
reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record. Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 
215 P.3d at 440; Porter, 130 Idaho at 786,948 P.2d at 141 (citing State v. Garcia, 100 
Idaho 108, 110, 594 P.2d 146, 148 (1979)). If a prosecutor exceeds this latitude and 
"attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury 
instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that 
may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment 
right to a fair triaL" Perry, 150 Idaho at _, 245 P.3d at 979. 
Although there was no testimony upon which to base the prosecutor's comments 
that the FBI no longer conducts GSR testing because such tests are not reliable (etc.) 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.1024, Ls.3-9), that is not the type of information which would have injected 
fundamental error into Branigh's trial by affecting the foundation of his case or depriving 
him of his right to a fair trial. With or without testimony to establish that the FBI does not 
conduct GSR testing because the test results are unreliable, the prosecutor was entitled 
to make common sense arguments to explain why such testing can be irrelevant -
which was the overall point of the prosecutor's comments. 
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In State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 718-720, 215 P.3d 414, 438-440 (2009), 
the Idaho Supreme Court considered, inter alia, whether several unobjected-to 
comments by the prosecutor during closing argument in Severson's first degree murder 
trial (for killing his wife, Mary) constituted fundamental error. The court found that while 
the prosecutor's comment, ""[n]obody knows, that has testified, what happened between 
them," "could be interpreted as a reference to Severson's failure to testify, it could also 
be accorded other meanings.,,17 Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 
(emphasis original). Next, the court found that the prosecutor's "statements that Mary 
was speaking from her grave were somewhat inflammatory because they were likely 
designed to appeal to the sympathies and passions of the jury.18 1..9.:. Third, the court 
determined that the prosecutor's comments about the victim's family arguably 
improperly asked the jury to identify with the victim.19 However, the court concluded 
17 More fully, the prosecutor stated: 
[t]his is a circumstantial case, because nobody was in that house that 
night but Mary and Larry. Nobody knows, that has testified, what 
happened between them." 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 718,215 P.3d at 438 (emphasis original). 
18 The prosecutor told the jury: 
Mary still speaks to us today. She is still telling us what happened that 
night and why she is dead . . .. Mary tells us, she speaks to us from her 
grave as to who killed her and why she died. 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439. 
19 The comments by the prosecutor were: 
Mary Severson isn't a decedent. Mary Severson was the 35-year-old 
mother of two boys. Mary Severson was the daughter of Carol Diaz. 
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that none of the comments by the prosecutor, individually or together, resulted in an 
unfair trial or deprived Severson of his due process rights, and therefore, did not rise to 
the level of fundamental error. 19.:.; cf. State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 574-575, 181 
P.3d 496, 500-501 (Ct. App. 2007) (closing argument comment that defendant told 
police "I intended to do this" was prosecutorial misconduct because it mischaracterized 
the testimony and went to the sole basis of the defense -- lack of intent due to severe 
mental illness). 
Here, as in Severson, none of the prosecutor's comments rise to the level of 
fundamental error. Some or most of the prosecutor's comments about GSR are simply 
common sense observations - reasonable inferences from the evidence - buttressing 
the argument that, in Branigh's case, GSR testing was irrelevant because: (1) negative 
test results could easily be due to Branigh washing his hands during the one hour and 
40 minute opportunity he had to do so after firing the weapon, and (2) positive test 
results could be explained by a variety of other sources of GSR - including transfer from 
officers who had fired shots at Branigh's tires when he was taken into custody. As 
Officer Stuck testified, the presence of GSR on the victim's wound can mean several 
things, and the prosecutor properly further argued that the presence/absence of GSR 
on Branigh could also be attributed to several things which would make testing 
pointless. (Tr., vol. 2, p.956, Ls.11-12.) The prosecutor was entitled to expound, using 
common sense and reasonable inferences, about how the relevance of GSR testing 
was minimized by such factors. Moreover, the jury was instructed by the court that the 
Mary Severson was the sister of Maria Gray. Mary Severson's life had 
purpose, and it had meaning. Your duty today is to give her death justice. 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 720,215 P.3d at 440. 
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arguments and statements of the lawyers are not evidence, and "[i]f the facts as you 
remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated them, follow your memory." 
(R., vol. V, p.948 (lnstr. No.4).) 
Branigh has failed to meet his burden of showing that the prosecutor's comments 
so infected the trial as to deprive him of his due process rights. Therefore, he has failed 
to meet the first requisite of Perry of showing a violation of a constitutional right. Perry, 
150 Idaho at _, 245 P.3d at 978. Accordingly, Branigh has also failed to demonstrate 
that a constitutional right of his was plainly violated and that such violation was not 
harmless, i.e., that this Court can find, beyond a reasonable doubt the constitutional 
violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict. 150 Idaho at _, 245 P.3d at 979-980. 
V. 
Branigh Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error As A Basis For Concluding The 
Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct Under Napue 
A. Introduction 
Branigh claims the prosecutor "violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process at his trial when he knowingly failed to correct false testimony that was 
tendered by Mr. Peak, who was one of the State's witnesses at trial." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.42.) Branigh asserts that Peak, who testified at trial about statements Branigh made 
to him while in custody together, falsely testified, and that the prosecutor knew or should 
have known the testimony was false. (ld. pp.42-43.) Branigh specifically contends, 
"[d]uring trial, when asked ... what his relationship was with former Sheriff Dorion, Mr. 
Peak characterized the officer as only an acquaintance and further responded that he 
only knew the former Sheriff as, "a resource officer at my high schoo!." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.43.) 
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Branigh's argument alleges a due process violation by the prosecutor under 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Under Napue, the government is obligated to 
correct any evidence introduced at trial that it knows to be false, regardless of whether 
or not the evidence was solicited by it. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269; Alcorta v. Texas, 355 
U.S. 28 (1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). Although Branigh argued in 
district court that the prosecutor committed a Bradlo violation for failing to disclose 
potentially eXCUlpatory information about Peak's relationship with the sheriff, he did not 
raise a Napue claim that the prosecutor knowingly introduced (or failed to correct) false 
testimony at trial. (See Supp. R., pp.197-209 (brief supporting motion for new trial).) 
Therefore, that issue is not subject to review by this Court unless Branigh establishes 
fundamental error under the three-part test of Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961. He 
has failed to do so. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for 
appeal through an objection at trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. Where 
a claim is raised for the first time on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether 
the error alleged qualifies as reviewable fundamental error. kl at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
[I]n cases of unobjected to fundamental error: (1) the defendant must 
demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without the 
need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected 
20 In contrast, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), "the government may not 
knowingly suppress evidence that is exculpatory or capable of impeaching government 
witnesses." Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1188 (9th Cir. 2012) see Banks v. 
Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (discussing Brady). 
45 
the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must 
have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." 19.:. (footnote omitted). 
19.:. (footnote omitted). 
C. Factual Background 
A report by F. B.I. Special Agent Douglas Hart was admitted into evidence at 
Branigh's evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial. (Mot. Tr., p.16, Ls.9-15;21 
Supp. Exs., pp.11-13.) According to that report, about a month after Mike Johnston's 
murder, Hart arranged a meeting when Lt. Charlie Spencer of the Idaho State Police 
received a call from the Nez Perce County Prosecutor, Dan Spickler, inquiring about 
whether the F.B.I. and I.S.P. were conducting an investigation of Nez Perce County 
Sheriff Jim Dorion. (Supp. Exs., p.11.) Agent Hart informed Spickler that the two 
agencies were at the preliminary stage of investigating Dorion, and that the existence of 
their investigation needed to stay confidential. (ld.) During the meeting, Spickler 
expressed several concerns about the sheriff: 
Spickler had heard that Dorion allowed young men to use his 
personal vehicles and allowed them to drive county vehicles; 
a young man by the name of Stephen Peak, suspected of several 
burglaries, was allegedly given access by Dorion to a law enforcement 
database ("Spillman") used by the Lewiston Police Department, the Nez 
Perce County Sheriff's Department, and other law enforcement agencies; 
a "number of people" spoke to Spickler regarding Peak's close, 
personal relationship with Dorion; 
Lewiston Police Officers informed Spickler that their confidential 
informants reported that Peak had access to the Spillman database, and 
one report said Peak had trained a new deputy on how to use the 
database; and 
21 The three hearing dates for Branigh's motion for a new trial are contained in one 
volume, which will be referred to as "Mot. Tr." 
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Lewiston Police Officers expressed great concern to Spickler about 
Peak's relationship with Dorion. 
(Id., pp.12-13.) Prior to trial, Spickler had no further contact with the F.B.1. or I.S.P. in 
regard to their joint investigation of Dorion, and did not disclose any of the above-
described information to Branigh prior to trial. 22 (Mot. Tr., pA1, L.20 - pA2, L.5; pA3, 
LsA-9; pA7, Ls.6-10.) 
During trial, Peak testified for the state that he had been incarcerated with 
Branigh for about two weeks, and Branigh was the only person Peak "hung out with 
during the time in there." (Tr., vol. 2, p.875, Ls.17-25.) Peak testified that during his 
time in jail, Branigh told him or talked about: 
a). conspiracy theories about how the Lewiston Police and Desiree 
Anderson were responsible for Mike Johnston's death, and Desiree 
wanted to be with Branigh (Tr., vol. 2, p.876, Ls.10-22); 
b). the medical examiner incorrectly identified the entry and exit bullet 
holes depicted in autopsy photos (Tr., vol. 2, p.877, L.21 - p.878, 
L.11 ); 
c). that autopsy photos showed that the victim "doesn't look so tough 
frozen in a body bag" (Tr., vol. 2, p.879, L.20- p.880, L.1); 
d). the position the victim had to have been in when he was shot by the 
shooter (Tr., vol. 2, p.880, LsA-11); 
e). the weapon "would have to be this certain type to have this same 
size of exit wound as the entrance wound" (Tr., vol. 2, p.880, Ls.19-
22); 
f). Mike Johnston's phone was inside the house and Desiree was the 
one texting Branigh when he thought he was texting with Mike 
Johnston (Tr., vol. 2, p.881, Ls.16-21); 
22 According to Spickler, F.B.1. Agent Hart and I.S.P. Lieutenant Spencer informed him 
during their meeting that he was "was not going to be involved in the investigation, and 
that they desired [him] to contact the State's AG's office to be the contact point for - for 
them in relationship to the investigation [and] that they would not be contacting [him] 
any further .... " (Mot. Tr., p.36, Ls.16-24; see Supp. R., p.221.) 
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g). a witness had seen Branigh's car over a fence line, but that "she 
wouldn't be able to see my car from there" (Tr., vol. 2, p.881, LS.21-
24); 
h). Branigh talked about a gun when describing where he went that 
night and said "he went up the old spiral highway around a corner is 
[sic] where he buried the gun (Tr., vol. 2, p.882, Ls.6-8); 
i). when Peak said "I thought you didn't do it," Branigh smiled at Peak 
and said "I didn't" (Tr., vol. 2, p.882, Ls.10-11); 
j). Branigh described his relationship with Desiree Anderson, including 
the rules she made about sex; that he couldn't tell anybody and that 
he couldn't leave any marks (Tr., vol. 2, p.883, Ls.6-11); 
k). Branigh talked about the places he and Desiree Anderson had sex, 
how he took pictures of her, that she would tell him to leave her 
alone but that she "doesn't know that she really loves him" (Tr., vol. 
2, p.883, Ls.14-19); 
I). when Branigh was showing Peak pictures from his case, Branigh 
talked about hearts on the steps in the tile in the bricks, said it 
would be a good place to die, stated he had never seen a person's 
eyes when they died, always wondered what would go through a 
dying person's mind, and said he wished he would have stuck 
around (Tr., vol. 2, p.885, Ls.2-9); 
m). when Branigh went through text messages exchanged between 
himself and Desiree Anderson, Peak said he thought Branigh's cell 
phone had been stolen and Peak smiled and said it was (Tr., vol. 2, 
p.885, Ls.12-17); 
n). in regard to the police pursuit the night of the murder, Branigh said 
he wanted to go to Albertson's because they have cameras there 
and he felt the police were going to shoot him and he wanted there 
to be evidence, then he decided that if he was going to die he was 
going to die at his father's house and he wanted his father to see 
him die (Tr., vol. 2, p.886, L.10 - p.887, L.4); 
0). Branigh said he had gotten high octane gas for his car because he 
knew he would be in a chase so that his car would go faster (Tr., 
vol. 2, p.887, L.24 - p.888, L.2). 
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D. Branigh Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
Because Branigh did not present his Napue issue in the district court, the state 
had no notice or opportunity to contest the issue below, and the district court made no 
findings of fact or rulings concerning the issue. Therefore, Branigh's argument that the 
prosecutor committed a Napue violation can only be reviewed for fundamental error. 23 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
1. Branigh Has Failed To Show A Violation Of A Constitutional Right -- Prong 
One Of Perry 
Branigh has failed to meet the first requirement for showing fundamental error 
under Perry -- that one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated. 150 
Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. In Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, the Supreme Court 
reiterated the well-established principle that the state cannot obtain a conviction through 
the knowing presentation of false evidence, including false testimony. "The same result 
obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go 
uncorrected when it appears." 1.9.:. at 269 (citations omitted). ''To prevail on a Napue 
claim, [Branigh] must show that '(1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) 
the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and 
(3) ... the false testimony was materiaL"' Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 916 (9th Cir. 
2006) (quoting Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). 
Materiality is based upon whether there is "any reasonable likelihood that the false 
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 
23 Branigh contends that "this Court should review his claim of a due process violation 
directly, as he could not have raised any objection at trial. (Appellant's Brief, p.41.) 
However, Branigh could have easily presented his Napue claim along with his Brady 
claim in his motion for a new trial, which was heard over two years after his conviction. 
49 
649, 8 P.3d 636, 644 (2000) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 
(1985». '''[T]he fact that testimony is perjured is considered material unless failure to 
disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" kl. 
Branigh cannot demonstrate that Peak's trial testimony about his relationship 
with Sheriff Dorion was false, much less that the prosecutor knew about such (a"eged) 
falsity at the time of trial. On appeal, Branigh asserts that, "when asked by Mr. Branigh 
what his relationship was with former Sheriff Dorion, Mr. Peak characterized the officer 
as only an acquaintance and further responded that he only knew the former Sheriff as[ 
] 'a resource officer at my high schooL'" (Appellant's Brief, p.43.) Contrary to Branigh's 
assertion, Peak did not characterize his relationship with the sheriff as "only an 
acquaintance." It was Branigh - not Peak -- who injected the word "acquainted" into the 
record by asking Peak, "[a]re you acquainted with him?" and Peak answered "yes." (Tr., 
vol. 2, p.890, Ls.24-25.) The question by Branigh called for a "yes" or "no" answer from 
Peak, and "yes" was certainly the only true response. Moreover, Peak did not say 
anything about his relationship with the sheriff as being "only" an acquaintance. It is 
Branigh who, on appeal, has tacked the word "only" onto the phraseology of his own 
question to Peak in order to create the tag-line that Peak testified falsely that his 
relationship with the sheriff was "only as an acquaintance." Branigh's contention that 
Peak testified that he was "only an acquaintance" of the sheriff is not an accurate 
recitation of Peak's testimony. 
Branigh similarly alleges that Peak "responded that he only knew the former 
Sheriff as[ ] 'a resource officer at my high schooL'" (Appellant's Brief, p.43.) Again, the 
word "only" is an appellate creation of Branigh. The record shows that after Peak was 
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asked if he was acquainted with the sheriff and answered "yes," Branigh immediately 
asked "[a]nd how is that?" and Peak responded "[h]e was a resource officer at my high 
school." (Tr., vol. 2, p.891, Ls.1-2.) In the context of the two questions, Peak appears 
to have understood Branigh as asking how he became acquainted with the sheriff, and 
answered that he "was a resource officer at my high school." Branigh's attempt to 
characterize Peak's answer as a deliberate false statement by claiming Peak testified 
that he "only" knew the sheriff as a resource officer is specious.24 Peak never used the 
word "only" in that discussion, was not asked if that was the "only" way he was 
acquainted with the sheriff, and clearly was responding to Branigh's question of "how is 
that" in regard to how he became acquainted with the sheriff. See United States v. 
Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (mere inconsistencies in evidence do not 
constitute knowing use of perjured testimony; it is the province of the jury to resolve 
disputed testimony). Because none of the allegedly false testimony Branigh identifies 
was actually provided by the witness, he has not established the first factor of the 
Napue standard. 
Branigh has also failed to meet the second requisite of Napue, because he 
cannot demonstrate the prosecutor knew or should have known, at the time of trial, that 
Peak's testimony was false. During the hearing on Branigh's motion for a new trial, held 
over two years after Branigh's conviction, Spickler was asked "[d]o you think" it was a 
true statement for Peak to testify "he was an acquaintance" of Dorion," and answered, 
"[a]s far as it went." (Mot. Tr., p.50, Ls.3-11.) When asked, "[d]o you think it was the 
whole truth?" Spickler, with the benefit of two years of hindsight, said it was not. (Mot. 
24 The last question Peak was asked by Branigh at trial was, "[b]ut you do know Jim 
Dorian; correct?" and Peak answered "[y]es." (Tr., vol. 2, p.906, Ls.6-7.) 
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Tr., p.50, Ls.12-13.) However, Spickler was not asked if he knew at the time Peak 
testified if Peak's testimony was true. Moreover, as discussed, during trial Peak merely 
answered "yes" to Branigh's question, "[a]re you acquainted with him?" and when 
Branigh asked "[a]nd how is that?" Peak explained H[h]e was a resource officer at my 
high schoo!." (Tr., vol. 2, p.890, L.24 - p.891, L.2.) Spickler was not asked to explain 
what he knew about the truth or falsity of Peak's testimony at the time that testimony 
was presented at trial, a necessity in establishing a Napue violation. 
Lastly, Branigh cannot meet the third and final requirement of Napue by showing 
there is "any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury." Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 985 (9th Cir. 2005); Sivak, 134 
Idaho at 649, 8 P.3d at 644 (2000). Based upon the testimony and evidence presented 
at trial, as set forth in the Statement of Facts, supra, even if the first two elements of a 
Napue violation are met, this Court can say there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
(alleged) false testimony could have affected Branigh's the judgment of the jury. 
Based on the foregoing, Branigh's Napue claim is without merit. Accordingly, the 
prosecutor had no duty to "correct" Peak's testimony. As to the first prong of the Perry 
standard, Branigh has not established that he suffered any violation of an unwaived 
constitutional right. 
2. Branigh Has Failed To Show Clear Error - Prong Two Of Perry 
Branigh has also failed to show the alleged Napue violation is "clear or obvious, 
without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision[.]" Perry, 
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Although Branigh implies that the record 
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demonstrates a clear or obvious Napue violation (Appellant's Brief, pp.4D-42), the 
record he relies upon as the basis for his argument is not extant. Branigh mistakenly 
asserts that Peak "testified falsely before the jury that his relationship with ... Dorion 
was one of mere acquaintance, and that he knew the officer only due to the fact that the 
former Sheriff was a resource officer at Mr. Peak's high schooL" (Appellant's Brief, p.4D 
(emphasis added); see id., p.43 ("Mr. Peak characterized the officer as only an 
acquaintance and further responded that he only knew the former Sheriff as, 'a resource 
officer at my high schooL'" (emphasis added).) Branigh's inaccurate portrayal of Peak's 
trial testimony does not create the type of complete record endorsed by Perry by which 
this Court can determine whether a Napue violation occurred during Branigh's trial. 
The record does not show a clear or obvious Napue violation because it does not 
even reveal that Peak testified falsely at trial. Additionally, the record is insufficient to 
establish what the prosecutor knew or should have known at the time of trial about the 
truthfulness of Peak's trial testimony. The prosecutor was never asked that question at 
the hearing on Branigh's motion for a new trial. Moreover, neither the Napue issue nor 
its blatant implication -- that the prosecutor knowingly elicited or allowed false testimony 
at trial -- were raised by Branigh, contested by the parties, or considered and ruled upon 
by the district court. Because these issues were not raised below, this Court cannot 
merely assume that all evidence necessary for their resolution is in the record. 
Inasmuch as Branigh has failed to show a Napue violation is clear or obvious 
from the record, he has failed to meet the second requirement for showing fundamental 
error under Perry. 
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3. Branigh Has Failed To Show A Reasonable Probability That The Error 
Affected The Outcome Of The Trial- Prong Three Of Perry 
Even assuming a violation of one of his unwaived constitutional rights is clear 
and obvious from the record, Branigh has failed to meet the third prong of Perry by 
showing "a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. The state relies upon its 
Statement of Facts, supra, to show that even if the first two prongs for showing 
fundamental error under Perry are met, this Court can say there is no reasonable 
probability that the (alleged) false testimony could have affected the outcome of 
Branigh's trial. 
Branigh has failed to demonstrate any of the three elements required under Perry 
for showing fundamental error. Therefore, his Napue claim cannot be reviewed. 
VI. 
Branigh Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His Brady Claim 
A. Introduction 
Branigh's motion for a new trial was based on two grounds, the first of which was 
his allegation that the prosecutor committed a BradyZ5 violation by withholding 
potentially exculpatory (or impeaching) information about Stephen Peak's close 
relationship with Sheriff Dorion and reports that Peak had been allowed access to the 
Spillman law enforcement database.26 (Supp. R., pp.197-209.) The district court first 
held that the prosecutor withheld information required to be disclosed under Brady, and 
25 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
26 Branigh's second ground for a new trial more generally asserted that Peak's 
relationship with the sheriff was newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial under 
I.C. § 19-2406(7). (Supp. R., pp.197-209.) 
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characterized such withholding as a Brady violation. (Supp. R., pp.467-482.) The court 
explained: 
By the time the Branigh trial commenced, the prosecutor knew the 
relationship between Peak and Dorion was such that Peak could have 
accessed confidential police information through Spillman or from Dorion. 
At the very least, the prosecutor had direct information from law 
enforcement officers regarding the Peak/Dorion relationship and knew an 
investigation was being conducted by the FBI, Idaho State Police and the 
Lewiston City Police Department. Therefore, the findings of that 
investigation were available to the prosecutor had he made inquiry, an 
inquiry he was obligated to make once he decided to call Stephen Pak as 
a witness in light of the potential Brady nature of the Peak/Dorion 
relationship. 
(Supp. R., p.476.27) However, the court then determined that such a violation did not 
playa material role in Branigh's conviction, and denied his Brady-based motion for a 
new trial. (Id.) 
27 The district court incorrectly stated that the Lewiston City Police Department was one 
of the agencies investigating Peak's relationship with Sheriff Dorion - only the FBI and 
the Idaho State Police were involved in that investigation. (Supp. R., p.19 ("the FBI and 
ISP were conducting an investigation of Nez Perce County Sheriff Jim Dorion"), p.221 ( 
the FBI and ISP advised Spickler "that an investigation of Dorion had been opened by 
[the] two agencies.") It should also be recalled that, according to Spickler, FBI Agent 
Hart and ISP Lieutenant Spencer informed him during their meeting that he "was not 
going to be involved in the investigation, and that they desired [him] to contact the 
State's AG's office to be the contact point for - for them in relationship to the 
investigation [and] that they would not be contacting [him] any further .... " (Mot. Tr., 
p.36, Ls.16-24; see Supp. R., p.221.) Prior to trial, Spickler had no further contact with 
the F.B.I. or I.S.P. in regard to their joint investigation of Dorion, and did not disclose 
any of the above-described information to Branigh prior to trial. (Mot. Tr., p.41, L.20 -
p.42, L.5; p.43, Ls.4-9; p.47, Ls.6-10.) 
Even though the prosecutor knew about the joint investigation by the FBI and 
ISP, contrary to the district court's conclusion, he had no duty to inquire or investigate 
further into their investigation in order to disclose updated information therefrom. The 
duty to produce material exculpatory information encompasses the duty to investigate 
"any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, 
including the police." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (emphasis added). 
Because the FBI and ISP were not involved in the Branigh prosecution, they were not 
"acting on the government's behalf in the case," id.; therefore, the prosecutor had no 
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Branigh argues that "the district court erred when it denied his motion for a new 
trial based upon the prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory impeachment 
evidence." (Appellant's Brief, ppA7-48.). Branigh specifically contends (1) inasmuch as 
the district court found all the elements of a Brady violation were met, it "erroneously 
determined that he was not entitled to a new trial based upon its conclusion that the 
remaining evidence - aside from the testimony of Mr. Peak - was sufficient to convict 
Mr. Branigh[,]" and (2) the "sufficient evidence" holding "is clearly inconsistent with 
controlling case law from the United States Supreme Court." (ld., pA8.) 
The district court's denial of Branigh's Brady claim was correct, although for more 
than the reasons expressed by the court. In ostensibly finding "materiality" under Brady, 
the court did not apply the correct legal standard. However, wren next determining 
whether the alleged Brady violation warranted a motion for a new trial under the 
materiality and prejudice elements of State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 
972, 978 (1976),28 the court applied the standard for materiality under Brady, and 
concluded that Branigh had failed to meet it. Because the district court found that 
Branigh failed to meet the materiality test required by Brady, its finding that there was a 
Brady violation is incorrect. Therefore, the district court's denial of Branigh's Brady 
claim was correct and must be upheld, although on different grounds. 
obligation to follow up on the findings of their investigation. See United States v. 
Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2003) (no duty to learn information possessed by 
governmental agencies with no involvement in investigation). Thus, the only information 
withheld was the fact of the investigation, not the evidence or conclusions uncovered by 
the investigation. The district court's conclusion otherwise is clearly erroneous. 
28 Under Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978, the requirements for granting a 
motion for a new trial are: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to 
the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or 
impeaching; (3) it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the 
evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of 
deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of 
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State 
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 
Idaho 712,720,23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. Standards Of Law Applicable To Brady Claims 
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the prosecution is required to 
disclose to the defense all eXCUlpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession. 
The duty to disclose includes impeachment evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667, 676 (1985). "[T]he Constitution is not violated every time the government fails 
or chooses not to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the defense." Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1995). Rather, "suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused ... violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution." 1st at 432 (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). Evidence is "material" "if there 
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Kyles, 
514 U.S. at 433. 
To prove a Brady violation, a defendant must show: (1) that the evidence was 
eXCUlpatory or impeaching; (2) it should have been but was not produced; and (3) the 
suppressed evidence was material to his guilt or punishment. Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). According to the Supreme Court, "the materiality inquiry is not 
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just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light 
of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury's 
conclusions. Rather, the question is whether 'the favorable evidence could reasonably 
be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in 
the verdict.'" 19.:. at 290 (citations omitted). 
D. The District Court's Factual Findings Show That The Evidence Was Not Material 
Although the district court ostensibly concluded that all three elements needed to 
establish a Brady violation had been met (Supp. R., p.475-477), review of the court's 
opinion reveals that the "materiality" standard it applied in regard to third Brady element 
was not the materiality element actually required by Brady. 
As noted, the test for materiality under Brady is whether "there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 
433. A "reasonable probability" of a different result is shown when the withholding of 
information "undermines confidence in the outcome of the tria!." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434; 
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. However, the district court applied a different standard for 
materiality in its Brady determination, to wit: 
Finally, there can be little doubt that Branigh was prejudiced by the 
withholding of evidence that carried such palpable impeachment value. 
Peak was called as a witness by the State, speaking to the significance 
the prosecutor placed upon his testimony. The logical next step the 
prosecutor should have made was to recognize that evidence of Peak's 
opportunity to obtain information from a source other than Branigh was 
material and opened the door for impeachment, thus requiring disclosure. 
Yet, Branigh was denied the evidence, evidence that fell squarely within 
Brady disclosure requirements, was specifically requested, and was within 
the knowledge of the prosecutor. 
(Supp. R., p.476.) 
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In the ensuing part of the district court's opinion discussing the elements required 
for obtaining a new trial, the court made it clear that its earlier Brady materiality 
determination was based upon finding the withheld information was relevant for 
impeachment purposes - not how the withheld information may have impacted the 
results of the trial. The court explained: 
As noted by the Court above, the withheld evidence was relevant to the 
credibility of Peak's testimony and clearly had substantial impeachment 
value. However, Defendant Branigh failed to show that the evidence 
regarding the relationship between Peak and Dorion was material to the 
State's case against Branigh, or that it was material for more than its 
impeachment value. 
(Supp. R., pp.477-478.) 
The district court's ruling that Branigh met Brady's materiality requirement was 
not based on the correct legal standard. When the court talked about "materiality" in the 
context of the Brady claim, it meant something akin to "relevance to impeachment value 
or purposes" -- not the overarching questions of whether, had information not been 
withheld, there is a reasonable probability of a different result of the trial, or whether 
confidence in the results of the trial has been undermined. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-
434; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682,678. 
In considering Branigh's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence, however, the district court found that Branigh failed to demonstrate materiality 
under the exact standard required for Brady claims?9 A review of the record shows 
that, contrary to Branigh's argument, the district court did not apply a materiality 
29 Although the second and third requirements for granting a motion for a new trial 
under Drapeau (i.e., (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching, 
and (3) it will probably produce an acquittal) are equivalent to the "reasonable 
probability" materiality standard of Brady, the district court actually adopted the precise 
phraseology of the Brady standard. 
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standard based on "sufficiency of the evidence" or even I.C. § 19-2406 and Drapeau 
(see Appellant's Brief, pp.50-51), rather, it applied the same standard required by 
Brady. 
After finding a Brady violation, the district court's opinion next concluded that, in 
the purported application of the Drapeau requirements for granting motions for a new 
trial, the non-disclosure of the information about Peak was not material. Most 
significantly, the court used the Brady standard for materiality in making its 
determination that Branigh did not meet the materiality element of Drapeau. Under the 
heading of "Motion for New Trial," the district court set forth the materiality standards for 
Brady violations (without specific mention of Brady, but in regard to non-disclosure of 
evidence), including (1) showing a "reasonable probability ... the result of the 
proceedings would have been different," citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433, and (2) that a 
"reasonable probability" (etc.) is one where the "government's evidentiary suppression 
'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial,'" citing id., 514 U.S. at 434. (Supp. 
R., p.477.) When it began to render its decision on the motion for a new trial, the court 
adopted the afore-mentioned standards of Brady-based materiality, specifically ruling: 
Finally, Defendant Branigh has failed to show that, had the withheld 
evidence been disclosed, there is a reasonable probability of a different 
result. ... However, it is not probable that it would have produced a 
different result given the significant amount of evidence presented to the 
jury that had no relationship to Peak or the statements alleged by Peak to 
have been made by Branigh. 
(Supp. R., p.478 (emphasis added).) The court then outlined the untainted and 
"significant amount of evidence" presented to the jury showing Branigh's guilt (Supp. 
Tr., pp.478-480), and at the end of its opinion stated: 
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When the testimony of Stephen Peak is set aside, the remaining evidence 
presented by the State was more than sufficient for the jury to have 
reached a verdict of guilty. Therefore, while the Court finds the 
withholding of impeachment evidence a violation of Brady and its progeny, 
the Court is unable to find the evidence would have likely resulted in an 
acquittal had the evidence been disclosed prior to trial. 
(Supp. R, pp.480-481 (emphasis added).) 
Branigh filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court's denial of his 
motion for a new trial (Supp. R, pp.483-484), which the district court denied (id" 
pp.517-520). The court explained that the sole basis of Branigh's motion was his 
assertion that the court applied an incorrect analysis in denying his motion for a new 
trial because it allegedly "failed to apply the 'reasonable probability' standard that the 
newly discovered evidence would have changed the outcome of the jury's verdict, 
instead wrongly applying the standard that the newly discovered evidence would have 
probably produced an acquittal." (Supp. R, p.519.) The court responded: 
The Court respectfully disagrees with Defendant Branigh's reading of the 
Court's Opinion. The Court addressed the newly discovered evidence 
utilizing the 'reasonable probability' standard, as is clearly noted at page 
12 of the Court's opinion. The Court, after careful review and as stated in 
its earlier opinion, remains of the opinion that if the testimony of Stephen 
Peak was completely removed from the record, the remaining evidence is 
clearly sufficient to support the jury's verdict. In other words, the withheld 
evidence cannot be found to undermine confidence in the verdict. 
(Id. (emphasis added).) 
On appeal, Branigh asserts that the district court should have applied the 
standard for materiality under Brady,30 but did not, and focuses on the one comment the 
30 Branigh contends the district court improperly used the materiality standard 
applicable to I.C. § 19-2406 instead of the Brady standard. (Appellant's Brief, pp.50-
51.) However, his argument centers on the comment by the district court that the 
evidence presented by the state "was more than sufficient" to convict Branigh even 
without the testimony of Peak, which is not the same standard as Drapeau's second 
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district court made at the end of its initial decision denying his motion for a new trial; that 
the remaining evidence presented by the state "was more than sufficient for the jury to 
have reached a verdict of guilty." (Appellant's Brief, pp.48-51.) 
Branigh's argument is oblivious to the record. The district court not only prefaced 
its ruling on Branigh's motion for a new trial by citing the materiality standards of Brady 
as stated in Kyles and Bagley, it adopted that standard when it began rendering its 
decision. (Supp. Tr., pp.477-478 ("Branigh has failed to show that, had the withheld 
evidence been disclosed, there is a reasonable probability of a different result.") 
Although the district court used the "more than sufficient" language Branigh now asserts 
was the basis of its opinion, after Branigh asked the court to reconsider its decision on 
that ground, the court made it clear it had applied the "reasonable probability" standard 
at page 12 of its initial opinion, and added it was also finding that "the withheld evidence 
cannot be found to undermine confidence in the verdictL]" which two statements 
comprise the precise standards for materiality under Brady. (Supp. R., p.519.) 
Branigh side-steps the two Brady-materiality renditions in the court's order 
denying his motion for reconsideration, and instead states, "the district court denied this 
motion by reiterating that the court remained, 'of the opinion that if the testimony of 
Stephen Peak was completely removed from the record, the remaining evidence is 
clearly sufficient to support the jury's verdict.'" (Appellant's Brief, p.52; Supp. R., p.519.) 
However, when read in context (see above), the district court did not base its decision 
on a "sufficiency" standard of materiality. Its "sufficiency" comment was sandwiched 
between the two materiality statements from Kyles and Bagley (i.e., "reasonable 
and third requirements that the evidence be material, and that it will probably produce 
an acquittal. Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. 
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probability" (etc.) and "undermine confidence" (etc.)) that apply to Brady claims. (Supp. 
R., p.519.) Notably, the court concluded, "[i]n other words, the withheld evidence 
cannot be found to undermine confidence in the verdict[,]" one last assurance by the 
court that it was applying the Brady materiality standard. 
Because the district court applied the same materiality standard that is required 
by Brady when its analyzed materiality under Drapeau, and because the court held that 
Branigh failed to meet that standard of materiality, the court necessarily found that no 
Brady violation occurred. There can be no Brady violation unless all three elements 
have been met. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82 (1999) ("There are three components of a 
true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either 
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been 
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have 
ensued.") Therefore, the district court's denial of Branigh's Brady claim was correct and 
must be upheld. See White, 102 Idaho at 925, 644 P.2d at 319 ("This Court has held 
that where a ruling is correct it is immaterial that the reason given by the trial court for 
admitting the evidence may have been incorrect. "); Morris, 119 Idaho at 450, 807 P.2d 
at 1288 (on appellate review, the lower court's ruling must be upheld if it is capable of 
being upheld on any theory). 
Finally, the state relies upon its Statement of Facts, supra, which is based on the 
testimony presented during trial, to show that Branigh has failed to, and cannot, 
demonstrate materiality with regard to his Brady claim. The state also relies upon the 
district court's determination that the testimony of Peak added little to the state's case, 
explaining in its opinion denying Branigh's motion for a new trial: 
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The testimony provided by Peak at trial was of minimal value as Peak 
testified Branigh at all times denied shooting Johnston. Rather, Peak's 
testimony consisted of Peak inferring guilt based on Branigh's alleged 
comments regarding certain pieces of evidence and his asserted 
statement that he buried a gun in a particular location, though no gun was 
found despite an extensive police search of the area. When the 
testimony of Stephen Peak is set aside, the remaining evidence presented 
by the State was more than sufficient for the jury to have reached a verdict 
of guilty. Therefore ... the Court is unable to find the evidence would 
have likely resulted in an acquittal had the evidence been disclosed prior 
to trial. 
(Supp. R., pp.480-481.) Finally, as the district court noted, (1) Branigh made some 
admissions that he had discussed with Peak some of the subjects Peak testified about 
at trial, and (2) none of the significant information Peak testified about at trial could have 
been obtained through the Spillman database: 
At the hearing on the Motion for New trial [sic], a March 2008 letter 
from Branigh to a Lewiston Police Department Detective, admitted as 
State's Exhibit 2, confirmed that Branigh had told Peak some of what Peak 
claimed he had learned from Branigh. [Mot. Tr., p.120, L.14 - p.122, L.22] 
In addition, the Detective testified he had reviewed the Branigh case 
information maintained in Spillman, and it was his finding that none of the 
information testified to by Peak at trial was in the Spillman data base at 
the time Peak is believed to have had access to the system. [Mot. Tr., 
p.107, L.5-p.114, L.13) 
(Supp. R., p.478, n.8.) 
In sum, the district court correctly determined that Branigh failed to demonstrate 
either that Peak's testimony, or the withholding of information about Peak's relationship 
with the sheriff, played a material role in Branigh's conviction for first degree murder. 
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VII. 
Branigh Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error As A Basis For Concluding The 
District Court Erred In Denying His Motion For A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
After the jury found Branigh guilty of first degree murder with a firearm 
enhancement (R., vol. V, pp.941-942), he filed a motion for a new trial. (R., vol. V, 
pp.984-988; 1088-1089.) By the time of the hearing on his motion, there were two 
bases for the motion, the second of which was his claim that newly discovered evidence 
of Peak's relationship with the sheriff justified a new trial under I. C. § 19-2406(7).31 
(Supp. R., pp.197-209.) The district court denied Branigh's motion for a new trial on the 
second basis by relying on the materiality test of Brady, even though it also quoted and 
cited the Drapeau test as appropriate to such a motion.32 (Supp. R., pp.477-481.) On 
appeal, Branigh argues for the first time that Peak's testimony at the hearing on his 
motion for a new trial constitutes a "recantation" of his prior testimony, and therefore 
warranted the lesser materiality standard of State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 
P.2d 1152 (1985) -- showing a different result of the trial is "possible" -- should be 
applied instead of Drapeau's "probable" standard. (Appellant's Brief, pp.52-57.) 
Despite Branigh's argument, the question of whether Peak's testimony at the 
hearing on Branigh's motion for a new trial constitutes a recantation of his trial testimony 
was not raised or litigated in the district court, and there is no factual finding or adverse 
ruling from which to appeal. Therefore, that issue is not subject to review by this Court 
31 As discussed, the first basis was that the prosecutor allegedly violated Brady by 
withholding information about Peak's relationship with the sheriff. 
32 Because the two standards for materiality are essentially the same, the court's 
reliance on the Brady standard instead of, or in combination with, the Drapeau standard 
is not significant, nor has Branigh argued otherwise. 
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unless Branigh establishes fundamental error under the three-part test of Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961. Branigh has failed to do so. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court's discretion 
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. State v. Jones, 
127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Pugsley, 119 Idaho 62, 63, 803 
P.2d 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1991). 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for 
appeal through an objection at trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. Where 
a claim is raised for the first time on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether 
the error alleged qualifies as reviewable fundamental error. .!st. at 226,245 P.3d at 978. 
To demonstrate fundamental error, a defendant must show: (1) a violation of an 
unwaived constitutional right, (2) clear or obvious error, "without the need for any' 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision," and (3) "the error affected the 
defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected 
the outcome of the trial proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226,245 P.3d at 978. 
C. Branigh Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
Branigh did not present to the district court the issue of whether Peak's testimony 
at the hearing on Branigh's motion for a new trial constituted a recantation of his trial 
testimony that, in turn, required "possibility of a different result" materiality standard of 
Scroggins. (See R., vol. V, pp.984-988, 1088-1089 (motions for new trial); Supp. R., 
pp.197-209 (brief in support of motion for new trial); Mot. Tr., pp.131-147 (closing 
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arguments at hearing on motion for new trial.) The state, therefore, had no notice or 
opportunity to contest the issue below, and the district court made no findings of fact or 
rulings concerning the issue. 
As explained in Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P .3d at 980, "[i]f the alleged error 
was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it shall only be reviewed by an 
appellate court under Idaho's fundamental error doctrine." Because Branigh never 
argued to the district court that Peak's motion hearing testimony constituted a 
recantation of his trial testimony and that the Scroggins materiality standard applied to 
Branigh's motion for a new trial, nor objected to the district court's ruling on that basis, 
he cannot present his issue on appeal. kL. Therefore, Branigh's recantation/Scroggins 
issue can only be reviewed for fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 
978. Branigh has failed to meet the three-prong test for such error under Perry. 
1. Branigh Has Failed To Show A Violation Of A Constitutional Right -- Prong 
One Of Perry 
Branigh has failed to meet the first requirement for showing fundamental error 
under Perry -- that one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Branigh's argument that, because Peak 
allegedly recanted his trial testimony, the district court erred by not applying the 
Scroggins standard of materiality in determining his motion for a new trial under I.C. § 
19-2406(7), does not even allege a violation of Branigh's constitutional rights. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp.52-57.) Therefore, Branigh's recantation/Scroggins claim cannot 
be reviewed. 
Even if reviewed, Branigh has failed to show Peak's trial testimony was false and 
that he recanted his testimony at the motion hearing. Therefore, the district court did 
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not abuse its discretion by not adopting the materiality standard provided by Scroggins. 
In State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 72, 253 P.3d 727, 746 (2011) (emphasis original), 
the Idaho Supreme Court explained that in Scroggins it stated, '''where a defendant 
submits an affidavit by a government witness in which the witness recants his testimony 
and specifies in what ways he dishonestly testified and in what ways he would, if given 
the opportunity to testify again, change that testimony and where a defendant makes a 
showing that such changed testimony may be material to a finding of his guilt or 
innocence, a new trial should be held.'" The court then applied a three-part test for 
motions for new trial based on recanted trial testimony: (1) whether the testimony by a 
material witness was false, (2) whether the jury might have reached a different 
conclusion without the recanted testimony, and (3) whether "the party seeking the new 
trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet 
it, or, did not know it was false until after the trial." Ellington, 151 Idaho at 72-73, 253 
P.3d at 745-747. This test applies "where a government witness specifically identified 
that he had perjured himself on the stand, and further expressly recanted his testimony." 
kL 151 Idaho at 73, 253 P.3d at 747. It does not apply to inadvertent inaccurate 
statements by witnesses. State v. Barlow, 113 Idaho 573, 578, 746 P.2d 1032, 1037 
(1987). Branigh cannot demonstrate, as Scroggins and Ellington require, that (1) Peak 
testified falsely during trial, or (2) Peak recanted his trial testimony when he testified at 
the hearing on Branigh's motion for a new trial. 
Branigh asserts, "[a]t trial, Mr. Peak classified his relationship with the former 
Sheriff as mere acquaintances who were only known to one another through the fact 
that Mr. Dorion was a resource officer at Mr. Peak's school." (Appellant's Brief, p.55 
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(emphasis added).) Obviously, if Peak had testified at trial as Branigh asserts on 
appeal, that he and the sheriff were mere acquaintances who were only known to one 
another through the fact that the sheriff was a resource officer at Peak's high school, the 
testimony would have been false. (Appellant's Brief, p.55.) However, Branigh's 
rendition of Peak's testimony is divorced from what the record reveals. The state has 
previously shown that Peak did not testify falsely at trial, and relies on that argument, 
presented in section V, supra, for part of its argument in response to Branigh's claim. 
However, it should be recalled that, during Peak's trial testimony, it was Branigh who 
asked Peak if he was acquainted with the sheriff, to which Peak simply and truthfully 
responded "yes." (Tr., vol. 2, p.890, Ls.24-25.) When Branigh immediately asked, 
"[a]nd how is that?", a question that can reasonably be understood as inquiring how 
Peak became acquainted with the sheriff, Peak explained, "[h]e was a resource school 
officer at my high school" (id., p.891, Ls.1-2). Peak did not use the words "mere" or 
"only" (or any other words of limitation), during his trial testimony to make it seem as if 
he was a "mere" acquaintance of the sheriff, or that he "only" knew the sheriff from the 
sheriff having been a school resource officer. In fact, later during trial, Peak answered 
Branigh's question, U[b]ut you do know Jim Dorian [sic]; correct?," by saying "yes." (Tr., 
vol. 2, p.906, Ls.6-7.) Branigh has failed to show that Peak's trial testimony was false. 
Next, Branigh has failed to show Peak recanted his trial testimony during the 
hearing on Branigh's motion for a new trial. When Peak testified at that hearing, 
Branigh's counsel tried to re-cast what Peak's trial testimony had been. However, as 
shown by the following colloquy, Peak did not agree that his trial testimony had been 
false, nor did he recant his prior testimony: 
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Q. What was your relationship with Jim Dorian back in 2007, 2008? 
A. I don't know really how to describe it, I guess friends. 
Q. Were you more than acquaintances? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember testifying at the - Leotis' trial that you were 
acquaintances? 
A. I don't remember, no. 
Q. That wouldn't be the whole truth, would it? 
A. I would say that the things we talked about were more than what 
you would talk to a normal acquaintance, yeah. 
Q. So describe what your relationship with Jim Dorian was? [sic] 
A. It was on more of a personal level, we'd talk about crimes I had 
committed, my past, that sort of stuff. 
(Mot. Tr., p.80, L.16 - p.81, L.g.) The comment by Branigh's attorney, "[t]hat wouldn't 
be the whole truth, would it?" mischaracterized Peak's trial testimony to the extent it 
implied (1) Peak had been asked by Branigh at trial whether he and the sheriff were 
more than mere acquaintances, and (2) Peak had testified that being "acquainted" with 
the sheriff was the full extent of their relationship. Neither contention, if intended, was 
accurate. 
Peak did not agree with Branigh's attorney's characterization of his trial testimony 
-- nor did he recant it. Peak did not testify at the motion hearing that his trial testimony 
had been false. Instead, he said he and the sheriff talked about things that "were more 
than what you would talk to a normal acquaintance, yeah." (Id.) By saying, "yeah," 
Peak indicated there was more to his relationship with the sheriff than being only 
acquaintances. However, at trial, Branigh was not asked if, and did not claim, he was 
"only" an acquaintance of the sheriff - regardless of Branigh's repeated suggestions 
otherwise. Peak's testimony, similar to Ellington, does not provide "a situation where a 
government witness specifically identified that he had perjured himself on the stand, and 
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further expressly recanted his testimony." Ellington, 151 Idaho at 73, 253 P.3d at 747. 
This case does not involve a recantation by a material factual witness. 
In sum, Branigh's has failed to show a violation, much less a constitutional 
violation, by the district court's alleged failure to apply the lesser materiality standard of 
Scroggins to his motion for a new trial inasmuch as he has failed to demonstrate Peak's 
trial testimony was false, and that Peak's motion hearing testimony constituted a 
recantation of his trial testimony.33 
2. Branigh Has Failed To Show Clear Error - Prong Two Of Perry 
Branigh has also failed to show the alleged violation of failing to apply the 
Scroggins materiality standard because Peak (allegedly) recanted his trial testimony is 
"clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision[.]" Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. As noted, Branigh's claim does 
not even allege a violation of a constitutional right; rather, he alleges a violation of I. C. § 
19-2406(7) and the appellate court created rule in Scroggins of the standard to be 
applied to a motion for a new trial based on recanted trial testimony. 
Because Branigh did not raise his recantation/Scroggins issue in the district 
court, there are no factual findings by that court, nor is there any evidentiary 
development of the issue - much less a ruling employing the elements required to show 
that Peak's trial testimony was false, and that his hearing testimony constituted a 
recantation of his trial testimony under Scroggins. Branigh has failed to demonstrate, 
33 Branigh has not challenged the district court's application of either the Drapeau or 
Brady standards in denying his motion for a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406(7). (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp.52-57.) 
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as he must under Perry, that the record shows a clear and obvious constitutional 
violation. 
3. Branigh Has Failed To Show A Reasonable Probability That The Error 
Affected The Outcome Of His Motion For A New Trial - Prong Three Of 
Perry 
Inasmuch as Branigh has failed to show any constitutional violation, much less 
that a constitutional violation that is clear and obvious from the record, there can be on 
prejudice caused by the district court alleged failure to adopt the Scroggins materiality 
standard in deciding Branigh's motion for a new trial. Even assuming a constitutional 
violation is clear and obvious from the record, Branigh has failed to meet the third prong 
of Perry by showing "a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the 
trial proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. In the context of Branigh's 
motion for a new trial, a different outcome means that Branigh must show a reasonable 
probability that, absent the alleged violation, Branigh's motion for a new trial would have 
been granted. 
The state again relies upon its Statement of Facts, supra, to show that even if the 
first two prongs for showing fundamental error under Perry are met, this Court can say 
there is no reasonable probability that the district court alleged failure to apply the 
Scroggins materiality standard to Branigh's motion for a new trial could have affected 
the outcome of Branigh's trial. 
Branigh has failed to demonstrate any of the three elements required under Perry 
for showing fundamental error. Therefore, his recantation/Scroggins issue cannot be 
reviewed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Branigh's conviction. 
DATED this yth day of December, 2012. 
~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this yth day of December, 2012, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS & SARAH E TOMPKINS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
JCM/pm 
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER FILED 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
Post Office Box 1267 
81 Oal ~ Pfl 1 rJ6 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
Idaho State Bar No. 2923 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAH01 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III, ) 
Defendant. ) 
CASE NO. CR2007-0008107 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW, DANIEL L. SPICKLER, Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce County, 
Idaho, in the above-entitled matter and hereby respectfully submits the following Brief in 
Support of State's Motion for Reconsideration regarding Text Messages obtained from 
Defendant's Electronic Communications Service Provider 
The State apologizes to the Court for failing to timely provide specific references to 
the State's authority to issue a Search Warrant for stored wire and electronic 
communications and transactional records and to have said Warrant served extra-
territorially. 
1. AUTHORITY FOR EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SERVICE OF WARRANT 
Authority for both Federal and State Courts to issue extra-territorial search 
warrants is provided by 18 U.S.c. 2701 et. seq. (the Electronic Communication Privacy 
Act). The USA Patriot Act (Public Law 107-56) broadened the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 
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2703 to include stored wire and electronic communications. Definitions applicable to the 
ECPA are adopted from 18 U.S.C. 2510. 
Section 220 of the USA Patriot Act is entitled "Nationwide Service of Warrants for 
Electronic Evidence", and modified the provisions of the ECPA. 
As stated in Commentary, Chapter 121, Stored Wire and Electronic 
Communications and Transactional Records Access, National Institute for Trial Advocacy, 
James A. Adams (2008): 
Authorization for obtaining the contents of stored 
communications depends on two variables - the type of facility 
controlling the storage and the duration of the storage. To gain 
access to the content of materials stored in an "Electronic 
Communications Systemn (defined in 18 U.S.c. 2510 (14» that 
have been stored for 180 days or less, the government can 
require disclosure only by resorting to a Fourth Amendment 
search warrant. The search warrant issuance process was 
amended to permit issuance by any judge having jurisdiction 
over the offense (emphasis added) regardless of the locus of 
the electronic storage system. Thus, such warrants are valid 
nationwide regardless of where they are issued. 
The relevant statute, Title 18 U.S.c. 2703 (a), provides in pertinent part that: 
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider 
of electronic communications service of the contents of a wire 
or electronic communication that is in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty 
days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the 
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedures by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under 
investigation or equivalent state warrant. 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to state judges or state law 
enforcement. The State must only comply with Fourth Amendment requirements of 
probable cause. United States v. Kato~ (2004, CAlO Utah) 379 F.3d 1203, cert denied 
(2005 US) 200S US Lexis 1888; U.S. v. McKeever, (1990, CAS Tex) 905 F.2d 829; U.S. v. 
Piver, (1990, CA9 OR) 899 F.2d 881. 
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A rather complete discussion of the reasoning behind the Federal Legislation is 
given In the Matter of the Search of, Yahoo, Incorporated, 701 First Avenue, Sunnyvale, 
California 94089, (2007 US Dist , Ariz): 
Common sense dictates the result reached herein. Judicial and 
prosecutorial efficiency is better served by permitting the 
federal district court for the district where the crime allegedly 
occurred to preside over both the investigation and prosecution 
of that crime. Commentators have suggested that one reason 
for the amendments effected by Section 220 of the Patriot Act 
was to alleviate the burden placed on federal district courts in 
the Eastern District of Virginia and the Northern District of 
California where major internet service providers (tlISPs") AOL 
and Yahoo, respectively, are located. See, Paul K. Ohm, Parallel 
Effect Statutes [*12) and E-mail "Warrants": Reframing the 
Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1599, 1613-
15 (Aug. 2004); Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through 
Cyber/aw's Lens, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1375, 1454 (Aug. 2004) 
(stating that the "effect of the change was to shift the 
responsibility for issuance of the order from the court where the 
service provider is located to the court with jurisdiction over the 
offense being investigated; prior to passage of the USA Patriot 
Act, a disproportionate number of such orders were issued in 
the Eastern District of Virginia, where AOL is located."); 
Franklin E. Fink, The Name Behind the Screenname: Handling 
Information Requests Relating to Electronic Communications, 
19 No. 11 Computer & Internet Law 1, 6-7 (Nov. 2002) (stating 
that n[t]his provision was intended to relieve the burden on 
district courts in which major communications providers are 
located, such as the Northern District of California and Eastern 
District of Virginia. If). Indeed, the House Judiciary Committee's 
Report accompanying the USA Patriot Act explains that § 
2703(a) "attempts to address the investigative detays caused 
by the croSS-jurisdictional nature of the Internet." Paul K. Ohm, 
Parallel Effect Statutes and E-mail "Warrants": Reframing the 
Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. at 1614-15, 
n. 80 (Aug. 2004) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 107-236, pt. 1 at 57 
(2001». The Committee's Report further explains that requiring 
an investigator to coordinate with agents, prosecutors, and 
judges in the district where the ISP is located would cause time 
delays that "could be devastating to an investigation, especially 
where additional criminal or terrorists acts are planned." Id. 
(emphasis added). Additionally, requiring an Arizona federal 
agent investigating a crime committed in Arizona to travel to 
California or Virginia to obtain an out-of-district search warrant 
from a California or Virginia magistrate judge for electronically-
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stored communications would, in my view, unnecessarily 
increase the cost of federal investigations. 
2. 18 U.S.C. 2703(a) is applicable to the States. 
Lest there be any confusion about the referenced statute's applicability to the 
states, the Court's opinion in Ameritech v. McCann, 403 F.3d 908; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 
5941 discusses the issue regarding applicability of the ECPA to the states (in the context 
of 18 USC 2706, which deals with the requirement that governmental entities are 
responsible for reasonable costs incurred by the service provider): 
"A governmental entity" is considerably broader than "the 
federal government." The point of § 2706 is not to distinguish 
the federal government from other governments, but to 
distinguish the public from the private sector. Any private actor 
who wants information from a phone company will have to 
negotiate and pay for the service, when §2702 allows disclosure 
at all. Governments have a power of compulsion, and §2706 
attaches a price tag to the use of that power, just as the 
Constitution's takings clause requires compensation for other 
uses of governmental power to obtain private property. 
Although the Electronic Communications Privacy Act does not 
define the term "governmental entity, n it uses that phrase in 
several sections in ways that make application to state and local 
governments unmistakable. For example, §2703 specifies how a 
"governmental entity" can go about obliging a phone company to 
hand over records. The statute gives examples, such as "an 
administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute 
or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena" I 
§2703(b)(1)(B)(i). Other options include a "State warrant" 
(referred to in three subsections) and a "Federal or State grand 
jury or trial subpoena" (in § 2703(c)(2». Then there is § 
2703(d), which distinguishes what Ita State governmental 
authority" must do from how a federal governmental body 
proceeds, an odd reference indeed if the category "governmental 
entity" does not include states. 
The language of § 2703 and § 2706 taken together is enough to 
satisfy any plain-statement requirement for application of federal 
law to the states. Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61, 
115 L. Ed. 2d 410, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991). Although the 
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Congressional Budget Office expressed an opinion that the 1986 
law would not impose new costs on states, this view--on which 
Congress did not vote, and the President did not sign--cannot 
alter the meaning of enacted statutes. It suggests instead that 
the CBO erred (or perhaps thought that compensable demands 
would be so rare that the expenses under § 2706 would not 
make a dent in a governmental budget). 
Next in line is the District Attorney's argument that § 2706 does 
not preempt state law. It does not contain an express 
declaration of preemption, the District Attorney observes, and 
therefore (he says) does not supersede state law. Since when 
has such a declaration been required? The Constitution's 
supremacy clause does all the heavy lifting. Federal statutes 
prevail over state and local statutes to the extent of any 
inconsistency, whether or not Congress so declares one statute 
at a time. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 
481, 489, 93 l. Ed. 2d 883, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987). 
3. Defendant lacks standing to raise constitutional violation issues. 
In addition to the grounds asserted above, the State contends the Defendant is 
without standing to contest the State's obtaining records belonging to Sprint/Nextel. The 
records may be about the Defendant, but they do not belong to him. 
The Court, in Albert Terrill Jones v. United States of America, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
31892, observed: 
"A person has an expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth 
Amendment if he has a subjective expectation of privacy, and if 
society is prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively 
reasonable." United States v. Mira valles, 280 F.3d 1328, 1331 
(11th Cir. 2002) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 l. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). An individual's right to privacy is limited however. 
"[T)he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on 
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and 
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed." 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 1624, 
48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976) (limited by statute). 
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We have not addressed previously the existence of a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in text messages or e-mails. Those 
circuits that have addressed the question have compared e-mails 
with letters sent by postal mail. Although letters are protected 
by the Fourth Amendment, "if a letter is sent to another, the 
sender's expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon 
delivery." United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 
1996)(citations omitted). Similarly, an individual sending an e-
mail loses "a legitimate expectation of privacy in an e-mail that 
had already reached its recipient." Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 
333 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 
(2d Clr. 2004). See also United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 
418 (C.A.A.F. 1996) ("Drawing from these parallels, we can say 
that the transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable 
expectation that police officials will not intercept the 
transmission without probable cause and a search warrant. 
However, once the transmissions are received by another 
person, the transmitter no longer controls its destiny. "), cited in 
Guest, 255 F.3d at 333. 
CONCLUSION 
Since this Court has already determined the search warrant was properly issued 
upon probable cause, and that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of First Degree 
Murder committed in Nez Perce County I Idaho, for the reasons and on the grounds 
disclosed above, the State respectfully requests this Court to Reconsider its decision 
regarding the admissibility of Defendant's text messages and deny Defendant's Motion in 
Limine. . I'd 
DATED this ex - day of December 2008. 
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Prosecuting Attorney 
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AFFIDAVU OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was 
(1) hand delivered, or 
(2) hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) ../ sent via facsimile, or 
(4) mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO TH E FOLLOWING: 
Charles E. Kovis 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9292 
Moscow, ID 83843 
rJ 
DATED this ~ day of December 2008. 
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